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For a brief period in our nation's history, drug abusers
and alcoholics could receive disability cash assistance and free
medical coverage from the federal government by proving that
their addiction was severe enough to disable them from holding
any job. From 1972 until 1994, addicts could, with certain
qualifications, receive benefits under Social Security Disability
Insurance ("SSDI") or its sister program, Supplemental
Security Income ("SSI"). These programs provided not only a
nominal amount of monthly cash assistance, but also medical
coverage through Medicaid, with which recipients could pay for
drug treatment programs. The cases were eventually tagged
"DA&A," which alternatively stood for "Drug Abusers and
Alcoholics" (referring to the claimants themselves) or "Drug
Addiction and Alcoholism" (representing the underlying
impairment of the claim).
As one might expect, this aspect of the nation's welfare
program was controversial. The recession of the early 1990s,
among other factors, caused the welfare rolls to swell
inordinately.1 The increased welfare rolls generated more
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public resentment about providing any assistance to addicts,
much less assistance based on their addiction.! In 1994,
Congress passed legislation aimed at limiting the handouts to
addicts: recipients were required to participate in treatment
programs, and benefits were capped at three years.3 Instead of
shrinking the rolls of DA&A recipients, however, the numbers
burgeoned even further. In 1996, Congress eliminated benefits
altogether for those receiving SSI or SSDI on the basis of
addiction.4 Moreover, the 1996 changes require addicts who
suffer from other impairments to demonstrate that substance
abuse does not contribute materially to their alleged
disabilities.5 Substance abusers and addicts may receive
benefits, but only on the basis of other qualifying impairments,
plus a demonstration that their other disabilities would
continue even if their substance abuse stopped.
Predictions about the likely outcomes of the changes
varied considerably. Social workers and poverty advocates
anticipated throngs of homeless, helpless addicts bounced from
Medicare-funded treatment programs, driven to desperation by
the deprivation of their only safety net.6 Sponsors of the
restrictive legislation probably believed that cutting off the
supply of unearned income would force addicts to abandon
their habits and re-enter the workforce. The Social Security
Administration itself claimed that 75% of the 209,000
notes 22-30 and corresponding text for a discussion of some of the statistical data and
explanations offered by different commentators.
2 See Wright supra note 1, at 23, 31 for several examples and anecdotes.
Wright recounts a story from a California community newspaper about a drug raid in
which "Bakersfield police found a paper sack with more than $5,000 in it . . . [the
addict] produced documentation showing the money was hers via a'lump sum payment
from ... Supplemental Security Income .... Her disability: she is a heroin addict." Id.
at 23. This particular Cato Institute paper asserted that "[i]nvestigators have
determined that as many as 90 percent of SSI substance abusers use their benefits to
purchase alcohol and illegal drugs," recounting another anecdote of a San Francisco
SSI recipient who allegedly used his lump sum check for retroactive benefits to
purchase a large quantity of contraband for resale in smaller packages.
3 Establishment of the Social Security Administration as an Independent
Agency, Pub. L. No. 103-296 (1994).
4 Social Security Earnings Limitation Amendments, Pub. L. No. 104-121
(1996).
, See Determining Disability and Blindness Medical Considerations, 20
C.F.R. § 404.1535 (2001).
6 See, e.g., The National Coalition for the Homeless, Safety Network
Legislative Wrap-Up: The 104th's Legacy on Homelessness, Volume 15, Issue 4, Oct.-
Nov. 1996, available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/legwrap.html (last visited
Aug. 20, 2002).
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individuals affected by the new measures would easily re-
qualify for benefits based on their other impairments.7
They were wrong. Nearly six years have elapsed since
passage of the 1996 rules, and numerous studies have assessed
the consequences with mixed results. The studies, however,
clearly show that large numbers of addicts were dropped from
treatment programs, some became homeless, most did not re-
enroll on Social Security and no one is known to have entered
the workforce. s
This Article will begin to counter the dearth of
treatment given to these issues in the legal academic
literature. Whereas few scholars have proposed alternatives to
the status quo, this Article presents several possible options to
improve the current law regarding benefits for addicts. Part I
reviews the historical developments of the current rules. Part
II reviews the studies assessing the results of the 1996
legislative changes. In Part III, I explain and analyze the
underlying arguments for and against providing SSI and SSDI
benefits to alcoholics and drug addicts. This part begins with a
working model for understanding the nature of addiction itself
and describes the differences in perspective that underlie policy
decisions. Specifically, this section discusses the moral hazard
and rehabilitative approaches to welfare in light of social policy
and law and economics theory. Part IV presents several
possible alternatives for approaching the problem in the future,
and the advantages of disadvantages of each one. Finally, the
Conclusion recommends that addiction receive less punitive
treatment in eligibility decisions for benefits, and identifies
areas for further research.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Congress amended the Social Security Act ("SSA") in
1956 to create a Disability Insurance program.9 This program
7 Interim Report by the Lewin Group, Inc., Policy Evaluation of the Effect of
Legislation Prohibiting the Payment of Disability Benefits to Individuals Whose
Disability is Based on Drug Addiction and Alcoholism, ES-1 (April 28, 1998)
[hereinafter Interim Report]; see also infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
8 See Interim Report, supra note 7.
9 For a good discussion of the history of the welfare programs related to
disability, see Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist
Examination, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 923-32; Linda G. Mills & Anthony Arjo,
Disability Benefits, Substance Addiction, and the Undeserving Poor: A Critique of the
Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, 3 GEO. J. ON
FIGHTING POVERTY 125, 127 (1996).
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supplemented the survivors' benefits and retirement programs
already in existence (SSDI).' ° The underlying basis for
qualification was the "inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death of which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months."" Congress
restricted the Social Security system solely to applicants who
paid in based on their earnings.12
In 1958, dependents were given coverage, and in 1960
the original age restriction (50-65) was removed. 13 In 1972,
Congress created Supplemental Security Insurance for
individuals in poverty who would not be covered by SSDI. 4 The
1972 amendments marked the beginning of specific provisions
for drug addicts and alcoholics, although they did not identify
addiction as an independent basis for awarding benefits. 5 In
1975, in response to growing consensus in the medical
profession that alcoholism was a "disease" in its own right, the
SSA amended its regulations to delete the requirement of
physical organ damage before granting benefits. 6 In 1984,
Congress passed the Benefits Reform Act, requiring the SSA to
draft more "realistic" regulations addressing disabling mental
impairments.17 This led to the 1989 amendments, which
10 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1956).
1 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3) (2002); Relationship to Provisions Requiring
Deductions, 20 C.F.R. § 404.505(a) (2001).
12 That is, the original program in 1956 included only SSDI, and not an SSI
component for the poor.
13 See Wright, supra note 1.
14 Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603 (1972). This
replaced the previous Title XVI of the Social Security Act, which had provided for
grants to aid the blind, aged and disabled.
15 Originally, the Social Security Administration did not treat alcoholism as a
disease that could independently qualify an individual for benefits. Alcoholics were
granted disability benefits only when their alcohol abuse manifested itself in physical
symptoms of an independently recognized medical disorder of sufficient severity to
constitute an "impairment" precluding employment, under the listing for that separate
disorder. See Determining When a Consultative Examination Will be Obtained in
Connection with Disability Determinations, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519(c)(2)(iii) (1967);
Wilkerson v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 826, 835 (3d Cir. 1990) ("This policy, often referred to
as one requiring end-organ damage, was arguably consistent with the formerly
prevailing social and legal view that an alcoholic is simply an individual who lacks the
will or moral fiber to curb his self-indulgence.").
16 Rights and Benefits Based on Disability, 40 Fed. Reg. 30,262 (June 26,
1975).
17 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 421 note (1991); Wilkerson, 904 F.2d at 835.
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recognized alcoholism and addiction as independently
qualifying impairments.'8
SSI recipients whose addiction was "material" to the
finding of disability were required to participate in treatment
programs, where available, and to designate a representative
payee to handle the funds paid by Social Security. Their cases
were flagged with special DA&A codes for monitoring. No such
restrictions were placed on individuals receiving SSDI, nor on
SSI addict recipients who received benefits based on some
other impairment.19 Unlike SSDI, Congress based the SSI
program partly on financial need, created strict income
eligibility guidelines and offered no benefits for dependents.
20
Importantly, the mere presence of an addiction was never
sufficient grounds to grant benefits. Rather, an alcoholic or
addict had to provide convincing evidence that a combination of
severe symptoms, whether related to the addiction or not,
genuinely prevented the applicant from engaging in any
gainful work activity.21
18 The definition of substance addiction disorders that the SSA adopted was
"[b]ehavioral changes or physical changes associated with the regular use of substances
that affect the central nervous system." Determining Disability and Blindness, 20
C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (pt. A), § 12.09 (1989). It should be noted that the Social
Security Administration never actually incorporated the definition of Substance Abuse
Disorders commonly used by mental health professionals, as set forth in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (which at that time was in its revision of
the third edition, commonly known as the DSM-III-R), despite being ordered to by at
least one Circuit Court of Appeals. See Wilkerson, 904 F.2d at 832-33. The DSM-III
(and subsequent revisions) provides a general definition of Substance Abuse Disorders
that spans two full pages, before categorizing separate disorders for each intoxicant.
The two basic requirements are an increasing "tolerance" to the substance and
"withdrawal" symptoms following cessation, except withdrawal is unnoticable for
Alcohol and Cannabis. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 164-65 (3d ed. 1980).
19 Physician Comparability Allowances, Pub. L. No. 92-603 (1972). See also
Interim Report, supra note 7, at 1-2; Inspector General Report on Implementation of
Drug Addiction and Alcoholism Provisions of the P.L. 104-121 Before the House Comm.
on the Budget, Task Force on Welfare, 106th Cong., (2000) (statement of Ken Nibali,
Associate Commissioner for Disability).
20 For a detailed description of the process of obtaining benefits, and more of
the administrative differences between SSDI and SSI, see Mills & Aijo, supra note 9,
at 127-31.
21 See, e.g., Coleman v. Chater, 58 F.3d 577, 579-80 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Even if
we were to accept plaintiffs contention that he is an alcoholic, '[tihe mere presence of
alcoholism is not necessarily disabling.') (quoting Thompson v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 611,
614 (8th Cir. 1992)); Shelltrack v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding
that to establish disability based on alcoholism, claimant must show loss of self-control
to the extent he is unable to seek and use rehabilitation, and that disability is
encompassed by Social Security Act); Arroyo v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932
F.2d 82, 87 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that a claimant who seeks disability benefits on
grounds of alcoholism must prove addiction to alcohol, loss of ability to control
20021
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Between 1988 and 1994, SSI's costs nearly doubled. By
1993, nearly six million people received benefits under the
program, and payments totaled $20.7 billion.' The number of
recipients with addictions also grew during this period from
about 100,000 in 1989 to 250,000 in 1994, receiving a collective
$1.4 billion in benefits.23
Several factors may have caused this growth. In 1982,
the Social Security Administration issued an administrative
ruling recognizing that alcoholism and drug addiction could in
themselves be disabling diseases, even absent consequential
physical or mental injuries such as liver disease?' The
recession of the early 1990s also probably had an effect, as an
increasing number of people with impairments found
themselves unable to obtain gainful employment.
Professor Aaron Yelowitz suggested that as much as
20% of the growth in the SSI program in the early 1990s could
be due to its attachment with Medicaid, which increased
significantly in value and generosity immediately prior to this
period.' SSI grew faster during this period than other federal
welfare programs such as Aid For Families and Dependant
Children ("AFDC"), apparently due to this connection.26
Yelowitz cautioned against separating SSI and Medicaid. He
estimated that the government would only save 4.2% by
separating the programs.27 Since SSI covers the poor, who
generally have no health insurance, Medicaid coverage is a
significant incentive for disabled individuals to enroll.
drinking, and that alcoholism precludes claimant from engaging in substantial gainful
activity); Clem v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that mere
evidence of alcohol abuse does not discharge claimant from initial burden of proving he
is an alcoholic; "it is not the disease of alcoholism, but rather a claimant's uncontrolled
drinking, that may constitute a disability.") Although these cases are cited here for the
proposition that alcoholism alone did not qualify an applicant for benefits, they also
recognized that with the foregoing qualifications, addicts could receive benefits as long
as the remaining factors or requirements were in place.
22 The entire AFDC program totaled $12.27 billion in 1993. See Wright, supra
note 1, at 5 (citing U.S. HOUSE OF REP., COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 1994 GREEN
BOOK OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS (1994)).
See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, HEHS-94-128, Social Security: Major
Changes Needed For Disability Benefits For Addicts 3 (1994), available at http://-
www.access.gpo.gov/sudocs/aces/acesl60/shtml (last visited Sept. 12, 2002).
Evaluation of Drug Addiction and Alcoholism, S.S.R. 82-60 (1980).
Aaron Yelowitz, Why Did the SSI-Disabled Program Grow So Much?
Disentangling the Effect of Medicaid, 17 J. OF HEALTH ECON. 321, 321 (1998).
Id. at 322. The SSI caseload grew at about 6.1% per year, while AFDC
caseload grew at a more modest 4.1%.
2 Id. at 346.
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Some federal court decisions favorable to addicts
probably also contributed to the growth of the program.2 In
fact, most DA&A cases were generally concentrated in a few
states: California (24%), Illinois (12.2%), Michigan (7.8%), New
York (5.2%), Ohio (4.8%) and Tennessee (4.4%).2 The
concentrations likely are due to a combination of overall
population centers and federal circuit jurisdictions with rulings
most favorable to DA&A plaintiffs.3°
After the Republican takeover of Congress in 1992-1993,
the pendulum began to swing back. Concerned about the
growing numbers of addicts receiving benefits, Congress
included special provisions addressing DA&A in the Social
Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994
to reduce the perceived moral hazard problem.31 The provisions
placed a three-year time limit on SSIISSDI benefits to
recipients whose cases were flagged as DA&A. The treatment,
monitoring, and representative-payee requirements previously
applicable to only SSI recipients now applied to SSDI
recipients. Failure to comply with treatment resulted in
suspension of benefits.2
Attempts to curb DA&A benefits failed. Instead, the
number of beneficiaries grew substantially over the next two
years.m Members of Congress believed payment of benefits to
addicts "inappropriately divert[ed] scarce federal resources
from severely disabled individuals" and "provid[ed] a perverse
incentive, contrary to the long-term interest of addicts and
alcoholics, by providing them with cash payments so long as
they do not work."
See, e.g., Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1987); Ferguson v.
Schweiker, 641 F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that alcoholism alone or
combined with other causes can constitute a disability); Johnson v. Harris, 625 F.2d
311, 313 (9th Cir. 1980) ("severe alcoholism alone may be disabling within the meaning
of the Social Security laws"); Lewis v. Califano, 574 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1978) (stating
that full and fair record of alcohol disability must be developed); Griffis v. Weinberger,
509 F.2d 837, 838 (9th Cir. 1975) ("The proposition that chronic acute alcoholism is
itself a disease.., is hardly debatable today.").
See Interim Report, supra note 7, at 11-25. These percentages are for SSI
cases. The SSDI DA&A cases were more widely distributed across the country, but the
same states had the highest concentrations.
so See id. at 11-25-26. The First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits
were noted to have had favorable rules for DA&A cases.
31 Social Security Independence and Program Improvement Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-296 (1994).
32 Id.
33 See Interim Report, supra note 7, at 1-3.
Id. (citing SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, REPORT ON THE FAMILY SELF-
20021
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As a result, Congress again sought to remove the
"perverse incentives" by enacting the Contract With America
Advancement Act of 1996.5 The Contract eliminated SSDI/SSI
and Medicare/Medicaid coverage for those whose drug or
alcohol addiction is a "contributing factor material to their
disability."
Essentially, the new standard for eligibility asks
whether the claimant would still be disabled, due to other
impairments, if he or she stopped consuming drugs or alcohol.
The standard is set forth in the current SSDI regulations:
How we will determine whether your drug addiction or alcoholism is
a contributing factor material to the determination of disability: (a)
General. If we find that you are disabled and have medical evidence
of your drug addiction or alcoholism, we must determine whether
your drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to
the determination of disability. (b) Process we will follow when we
have medical evidence of your drug addiction or alcoholism. (1) The
key factor we will examine in determining whether drug addiction or
alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination of
disability is whether we would still find you disabled if you stopped
using drugs or alcohol. (2) In making this determination, we will
evaluate which of your current physical and mental limitations,
upon which we based our current disability determination, would
remain if you stopped using drugs or alcohol and then determine
whether any or all of your remaining limitations would be disabling.
(i) If we determine that your remaining limitations would not be
disabling, we will find that your drug addiction or alcoholism is a
contributing factor material to the determination of disability. (ii) If
we determine that your remaining limitations are disabling, you are
disabled independent of your drug addiction or alcoholism and we
will find that your drug addiction or alcoholism is not a contributing
factor material to the determination of disability.37
SUFFICIENCY ACT OF 1995, 104-96 (1995)).
3 Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121
(1996). The Contract provided for the phase-out of those already receiving benefits,
pursuant to normal due process hearing requirements, and the implementation of
strict rules for new applicants; these provisions are not terribly relevant to the
discussion here.
3 Id. at § 105. Addicts could, however, qualify based on other impairments.
Recently in Mitchel v. Commissioner, 182 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 1999), the Fourth Circuit
rejected an attempt to challenge the legislation based on equal protection violations.
The court found that there was a reasonable relationship between the legislation and a
legitimate government interest in deterring drug and alcohol abuse. See also Nicole
Fiocco, The Unpopular Disabled: Drug Addicts and Alcoholics Lose Benefits, 49 ADMIN.
L. REV. 1007 (1997) (arguing that the 1996 elimination of benefits for addicts violates
the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act).
3 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535 (2001).
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In practice, this standard functions as a "but-for" test: if
the applicant's disability would not exist but for continuing
substance abuse, e.g., inability to concentrate or persist in
tasks, then Social Security will deny the claim. This is
particularly relevant for claimants suffering from a dual
diagnosis of addiction and some other mental disorder, such as
depression, schizophrenia or attention deficit disorders.
However, claim adjudicators tend to disqualify any history of
substance abuse. For instance, in Sousa v. Callahan,' the
Ninth Circuit noted that the adjudicators below "failed to
distinguish between substance abuse contributing to the
disability and the disability remaining after the claimant
stopped using drugs or alcohol. . . . Just because substance
abuse contributes to a disability does not mean that when the
substance abuse ends, the disability will, too."39 Other courts
have similarly held that the SSA cannot deny benefits merely
because an addiction is present.4°
However, the question of who bears the burden of proof
for the "but-for" test remains unsettled. In Brown v. Apfel,41 the
Fifth Circuit held that the claimant bears the burden of
proving that drug or alcohol abuse is not a contributing factor
material to the disability. The Eighth,' Ninth and Eleventh'
Circuits followed suit on somewhat different facts.
On the other hand, a district court in Oregon held in
Clark v. Apfel' that a policy set forth in an internal Emergency
Teletype' 6 bound the Social Security Administration to prove
materiality in cases where the addiction and impairment are
38 143 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1245.
40 See, e.g., Sherman v. Apfel, 141 F.3d 1185, 1188 (10th Cir. 1998); Lee v.
Callahan, 133 F.3d 927, 932 (9th Cir. 1998); Downs v. Apfel, 9 F. Supp. 2d 230, 235
(W.D.N.Y. 1998).
41 192 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that a claimant with chronic back
pain and suicidal depression was not disabled because of insufficient proof that
drugs/alcohol did not contribute materially).
4 Middlestedt v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a claimant
with heart condition and seizures failed to show that alcohol was not a material factor,
thus, was not disabled).
Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2001).
Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that a claimant
with anxiety disorders and dizziness bears burden of proof that alcohol was not a
material factor).
98 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 2000).
Emergency Teletypes are internal policy and procedure memorandum
addressing urgent changes for local offices to implement, disseminating by faxing the
local offices instead of publication in the Federal Register or internal policy manuals.
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intertwined. The Emergency Teletype, EM-96-76 provided:
"When it is not possible to separate mental restrictions and
limitations imposed by the DAA and the various mental
disorders shown by the evidence, a finding of 'not material'
would be appropriate."47 The court found that the agency did
not follow its own internal procedures.Y A West Virginia
district court reached the same conclusion.49
The circuit court decisions have not addressed EM-96 in
their rulings because the parties did not raise the issue. It is
unclear whether their decisions override the policy set forth in
the Emergency Teletype, or how circuit courts would treat the
issue if raised. Another recent case from a district court in
Illinois5° mentioned the EM-96 problem, but the court did not
say whether its holding depended on this or on other facts in
the record.5' To date, the state of the law regarding but-for
causation is unclear.
But-for causation could function as a proxy, a way to
punish drug use itself. However, it invites the adjudicator to
speculate regarding whether each symptom or impairment
might improve without substance abuse. When the claimant
has the burden the analysis reverses to focus on whether the
substance abuse is exacerbating the condition to the point
where the substance abuse is deemed to cause the disability.
Such analysis forces the adjudicator to speculate. The claimant
cannot easily "prove" a claim without discontinuing substance
47 Emergency Teletype EM-96-76 from Dale Cox, Office of Disability, Social
Security Administration, Answer 29 (Aug. 30, 1996), available at http://www.ssas.com-
/daa-q&a.htm. EM-96-76 instructed local offices that the SSA had the burden of proof
to show materiality in cases where the claimant's addiction and other alleged
impairments are intertwined. Answer 29 reads:
We know of no research data upon which to reliably predict the
expected improvement in a coexisting mental impairment(s) should
drug/alcohol use stop. The most useful evidence that might be obtained
in such cases is that relating to a periods when the individual was not
using drugs/alcohol. Of course, when evaluating this type of evidence
consideration must be given to the length of the period of abstinence,
how recently it occurred, and whether there may have been any
increase in the limitations and restrictions imposed by the other mental
impairments since the last period of abstinence. When it is not possible
to separate the mental restrictions and limitations imposed by DAA
and the various other mental disorders shown by the evidence, a
finding of 'not disabled' would be appropriate.
Id.
48 Clark, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
49 Cutlip v. Apfel, CV No. 5:97CV154, (N.D. W.V, Aug. 10, 1998).
50 Christidis v. Massanari, No. C50412, 2001 WL 1160846 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1,
2001).
51 See id. at *9.
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abuse long enough to get medical documentation that the
impairment is independent of the abuse. This subjective
element leaves room for the adjudicator to overreact to any
mention of DA&A in the medical records. Such references are
generally explicit and visibly prominent,52  and their
prominence in the medical records creates a negative
psychological effect.
Courts increasingly place the burden on the claimant to
show that DA&A is not a material factor in the impairment.
This allows the adjudicator to deny the claim as a default
position until the claimant successfully challenges the denial.
Adjudicators have just enough discretion to punish most drug
users by denying their claims, even when more careful
reflection and application of the regulations would weigh in the
claimant's favor. Although past drug use is supposedly
irrelevant to determining disability, the fact that present use is
a factor could lead adjudicators to consider past use, as it
creates a suspicion of present behavior patterns.
The rule also generates confusion regarding etiology in
dual-diagnosis cases. Because many symptoms from the DA&A
overlap those of other valid mental disorders, the question
arises whether the claimant is self-medicating (through
substance abuse) a pre-existing medical condition or whether
the mental impairments are caused by the DA&A.
The pendulum does not appear to be swinging back in
favor of the pre-1994 "rehabilitation goal," at least in the
SSI/SSDI arena. 53 Instead, each circuit court considering the
issue has ruled that the claimant has the burden of proof,
increasing the bite of the 1996 reforms even further. In a sense,
placing the burden on the claimants in a "but-for" case creates
yet another incentive to discontinue substance abuse, to
rehabilitate oneself. It appears, therefore, that the moral
hazard paradigm, with its focus on incentives and the addict's
ability to make rational choices in response, remains the
reigning legal regime.
52 As a practitioner in this area, I have found in the files kept by the SSA for
individual clients that one mention in the claimant's medical records about any history
of substance is picked up and discussed on form after form completed by SSA medical
consultants, consultative examiners and disability adjudicators.




In the years since the laws changed to reflect moral
hazard concerns, numerous studies have analyzed the
consequences for the 209,000 individuals whose benefits were
terminated in 1997 and their communities. The empirical
evidence indicates that results were not what Congress
expected, nor have they been entirely optimal. The studies and
results cast doubt on the accuracy of the incentives-based
approach and moral hazard paradigm.
Perhaps the most important study was conducted by the
Lewin Group on behalf of the Social Security Administration
itself in 1997 and 1998.m The study was quite comprehensive
and tabulated an overwhelming amount of demographic and
sociological data about the affected parties. The study showed
the adverse impact of the legislative changes to the welfare
policy.
The Social Security Administration predicted that 70%
of targeted beneficiaries would retain or re-establish their
benefits on other bases. In fact, only half that number, 34%, did
so. In real numbers, this means 138,000 people permanently
lost their benefits, while 71,000 were able to retain them or
requalify. 6 About 28% never reapplied, either because they
knew they would not qualify again under the new rules, or
because of mental inability or misunderstanding. 7 Field offices
were unable to contact many claimants to clarify the changes
that were occurring because they did not have stable
addresses.' A common report was that "those most in need of
the benefit are also those least able to complete the
reapplication (or initial application) process," because of low
functional ability and "limited capacity to comply with the
requirements of the relatively complex and time consuming
reapplication process. ' 59
The study notes in several places that the Social
Security Administration misclassified as DA&A a certain
64 Interim Report, supra note 7.
65 Id. at ES-1.
56 Interim Report, supra note 7. Note that under the 1994 rules an estimated
35,000 would probably have lost their benefits for other reasons, such as
noncompliance with treatment or reaching the end of their thirty-six month maximum.
57 Id.
68 Id. at III-11.
59 Id.
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percentage of the 209,000 people whose benefits ended abruptly
in 1997.60 The actual percentage is unclear. Some systemic
practices inflated the numbers of DA&A recipients. In cases
where substance abuse was present in tandem with other
disabilities related to mental illness or back pain, which are
notoriously difficult to document, claim adjudicators frequently
granted the case on the basis of DA&A because it was easier to
document and saved time.' Moreover, adjudicators and
Administrative Law Judges knew that granting a case based
on DA&A would force an applicant with any substance abuse
problem to get mandatory treatment under the pre-1996 rules.
Many thought they were helping the claimants by categorizing
them this way.62 This indicates that the DA&A numbers that
incited Congress to pass the new measures were exaggerated,
and many individuals wrongly terminated.
In those states that had [Referral & Monitoring Agencies] before
1994, the designation [of DA&A] could result in referral to
treatment. There were, however, few adverse consequences
associated with the designation .... The designation of a program
participant as a DA&A beneficiary appears, however, to have been
an inexact process .... [P]ersons were designated as DA&A when
substance abuse may not have been their presenting problem, or
even a major factor in their disabling condition. As a consequence,
when the termination process was implemented following the 1996
legislation, some recipients may have received termination notices
who might otherwise have been unaffected.63
The biggest result of the new legislation was that far
fewer people were in treatment programs. The study found
"virtual unanimity" that former beneficiary participation in
treatment programs "dropped dramatically."6 Recipients
usually lost Medicare and Medicaid benefits with the
termination of SSDI/SSI, which eliminated their medical
coverage for aspects of treatment.6
Additionally, the income level of former beneficiaries
and their households decreased substantially. Although
officials expected many individuals or their family members to
move onto other state-run welfare programs, this did not
appear to happen. The rolls on Temporary Assistance For
60 Id.
61 Interim Report, supra note 7, at 11-26, 111-8.
6 Id. at 11-27, 111-8.
6 Id. at 111-7.




Needy Families ("TANF") and related programs did not
increase significantly.s
The study also noted repeated reports that the
"majority" of individuals whose benefits were terminated were
"unable to remain in their prior housing arrangements, and
some were thought to have become homeless."67 Moreover, four
different treatment agencies surveyed by the study reported
deaths from suicide attributable, at least in part, to the
termination of SSIISSDI benefits.s
As stated above, one purpose of the 1996 legislation was
to change the incentive structure for addicts and encourage
them to re-enter the workforce. This did not occur. The Lewin
Group study noted "very few reports of former beneficiaries
returning to employment.' This was true "across all states
and agencies."0
Interestingly, the study also examined the application of
the "materiality" test discussed in the previous section.71
Although the authors found the rule "relatively clear in
principle.... Conversations with some hearings examiners left
some doubt in [their] minds that the actual practice always
conformed to the intent. 2
Another study, presented by Kevin M. Campbell, Ph.D.
of the Association of Health Services Research, found that in
the year following the termination of SSI/SSDI benefits for
addicts, participation in outpatient programs steadily
declined. 73 Those in treatment programs whose benefits
continued, however, actually had higher levels of treatment
participation in the year after the legislation.
The Urban Health Study of the University of California-
San Francisco examined data from six communities around the
San Francisco Bay area, with a total of 1,224 subjects, all drug
Interim Report, supra note 7, at 111-15-16. Two states reported an increase
in the rolls for their General Assistance programs. See id. at ES-3.
67 Id. at 111-16.
68 Id.
9 Id. at ES-3.
70 Id. at 111-16.
71 This is the but-for test found in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535 (2002).
72 Interim Report, supra note 7, at 111-14.
Kevin M. Campbell et al., The Impact of Eliminating the SSI Drug
Addiction and Alcoholism (DA&A) Category on Participation in Substance Abuse
Treatment Among Former DA&A Beneficiaries, Health Services Research: Implications
for Policy, Delivery and Practice, June 1998 (abstracts available at http://www.acad-
emyhealth.org/abstracts/1998/campbell.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2002)).
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users. 74 Prior to the 1996 changes in the laws, subjects who
received SSI benefits were much less likely to be homeless than
those not receiving benefits (73 to 244, respectively).75 Overall,
the study concluded that intravenous drug addicts who
received SSI benefits had more stable housing, used drugs less
frequently and shared needles (a serious health risk) less often
than intravenous drug users without SSI.76 "In other words, it
appears that SSI benefits contribute to general life stability
and a reduction in drug-related harm."77 Conversely, the study
concluded that termination of benefits for addicts increased the
severity of social ills such as homelessness, illegal activity and
increased unsafe drug use. 78 This undermines the idea of a
moral hazard in granting benefits, in that recipients actually
used fewer drugs, and bolsters the rationale of a rehabilitation-
based policy.
Another study examined the likelihood of former
recipients to resort to crime, both before and after termination
of benefits. 79 The researchers focused on former recipients in
Chicago, selecting a random sample of 276. They found that
about 70% of the subjects had been arrested at least once, with
the most common crime being theft (22%), followed by battery
(9%) and possession of controlled substances (8%). The study
concluded that the relationship between criminal activity and
SSI status was more complex than originally thought:
Crime appears to be mediated more strongly by income level
regardless of the source of that income (i.e., whether it comes from
the government, family members, or employment). Thus, individuals
who are employed, but at substandard wages, may be more likely to
commit crimes to supplement their incomes than individuals who
are supported by their families or the government at higher levels.*
74 Id.
75 Jennifer Lorvick et al., The Withdrawal of SSI Disability Benefits from
Drug and Alcohol Addiction, Harm Reduction Communication, Fall 1997, available at
http'//www.harmreduction.org/news/fa197/ssi.html (last visited July 30, 2002).
76 Id. at 2.
77 Id.
7 Id.
79 Arthur Lurigio et al., The Criminality of Former Supplemental Security
Income Recipients for Drug and Alcohol Addiction Pre and Post-Benefit Termination,
Presentation before the Academy for Health Services 16th Annual Meeting (July 31,
1999) (abstract available at http://www.academyhealth.org/abstracts/1999/lurigio.htm




The implications of this study are very serious. Crime is
an externality of addiction. Again, however, it seems that the
actual incentives are different from the intuitions about the
moral hazards of welfare payments for addicts. A companion
study conducted by two of the three researchers found that
drug use in the Chicago area did not correlate to the receipt of
SSI benefits at all.8 Also noted was a significant number of
individuals who "fell through the cracks" after the policy
change, never reapplying for benefits despite having severe
psychiatric disorders that would have qualified them for
benefits independently of addiction.8 2
Simultaneously, another Chicago area study assessed
the impact of the 1996 legislative changes on treatment
participation. It noted that previous research indicated
retention in treatment programs was "inversely related to drug
use, criminality and homelessness." This study analyzed the
medical records of 632 subjects.8 The findings revealed that
patients were three times as likely to drop out of their
treatment program after Congress terminated their SSI
benefits (which included Medicaid) in 1997.85 "The average
length of stay (in group therapy visits) decreased 55% after the
policy was implemented. '" This study demonstrates that the
reform measures did not foster incentives for addicts to
rehabilitate at greater rates than when they received benefits.
In 1997 the National Health Care for the Homeless
Council presented and published a study surveying 3,648
individuals, which focused on issues of housing and
homelessness. Over 50% of former SSI/SSDI recipients who
81 See James Swartz & Paul Goldenstein, The Prevalence of Lifetime and
Current Severe Psychiatric Disorders, Drug Dependence, and Current Illegal Drug Use
Among Former Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Recipients for Drug and Alcohol
Addiction, Presentation at the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the Academy for Health
Services, Research and Health Policy (June 27, 1999) (abstract available at
http://www.academyhealth.org/abstracts/1999/swartz2.htm (last visited July 31, 2002)).
2 Id.
Tom Brady et al., Impact of Welfare Reform Policies at one Substance
Abuse Treatment Program in Chicago, Presentation at the Sixteenth Annual Meeting
of the Academy for Health Services Research and Health Policy (June 28, 1999)
(abstract available at http://www.academyhealth.org/1999/abstracts/brady3.htm (last




87 NAVL HEALTH CARE FOR THE HOMELESS COUNSEL, INC., THE EFFECTS OF
SSI AND SSDI TERMINATION AS SEEN IN HCH PROJECTS (1999), available at
http://www.nhchc.org/publications/ssi.htm (last visited July 31, 2002).
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previously paid for their own housing were in emergency
shelters one or two years after their benefits were terminated.8
Another 26.4% were staying with friends or relatives, in a
treatment bed or transitional housing.89 Overall, 64.2% of those
who lost their SSI/SSDI benefits "experienced a negative
change in their housing status."90 Regarding treatment
program participation, the study found that 29.4% of the
terminated SSI/SSDI recipients who had been in treatment
programs dropped out of programs when their benefits
discontinued. 91
Taken together, these studies illuminate the unpleasant
results of the legislative changes, such as increased
homelessness, lack of access to substance abuse treatment and
increased crime due to depleted income resources. A number of
people "fell through the cracks," who would still merit
SSI/SSDI benefits but who were unable to reapply and get
enrolled once more. These are social costs that should not be
ignored. It is, of course, difficult to quantify the costs of some of
these problems compared with the gross savings of withholding
benefits from the individuals. It is probably unrealistic,
therefore, to attempt a strict, accurate calculation of net social
gain or loss from granting or terminating benefits to addicts.
None of the studies attempt such a wholesale endeavor.
However, the empirical studies are valuable to the extent their
results appear to belie the assumptions and predictions of
either the moral hazard paradigm or the rehabilitation goal
paradigm.
The empirical studies did not bear out the behaviors
that the moral hazard approach predicted. The moral hazard
approach drove the 1996 legislative changes. Thus the
empirical data undermines the entire philosophical basis for
our current policy. Receipt of public benefits did not encourage
increased drug use, but lowered it. Terminated beneficiaries
did not move into the workforce or become more self-sufficient
when their benefits stopped. And addicts did not take measures
to rehabilitate themselves once the "encouragement" of public
benefits ceased. Rather, predictions based upon the
rehabilitation-goal approach, which viewed addicts as unable to
88 Id.





engage in much self-help toward productivity and self-
sufficiency, seem more congruent with the results of numerous
empirical studies.
Admittedly, those conducting many of the studies
already advocate the rehabilitation-goal approach. For this
reason, I analyzed the Lewin Group study, which the Social
Security Administration oversaw, first and gave it the most
discussion. If anything, the SSA had an incentive to justify its
changed rules and portray its own optimistic predictions as
being fulfilled. That the study concluded otherwise increases
its credibility.
Why didn't the legislation achieve the desired results? A
reasonable inference is that mistaken assumptions underlay
the legislative action in the first place. Inaccurate assumptions
or information generate inaccurate predictions. And inaccurate
predictions lead to ineffective results.
III. MORAL HAZARD VS. REHABILITATION
The arguments against paying public benefits on the
basis of DA&A are fairly straightforward: it seems
counterintuitive to give a financial award to individuals for
their self-destructive behavior, much less illegal activities such
as the habitual consumption of contraband. Protecting
individuals from the risks of such behavior is thought to create
a moral hazard problem.9
On the other hand, the arguments in favor of granting
public benefits to addicts focus on the goal of rehabilitation,
and the inability of addicts to rehabilitate themselves without
The term "moral hazard" is generally used to refer to the perverse
incentives that can be created by insurance, often explained with an anecdote about a
farmer boasting to his neighbor that he had just purchased both flood insurance and
fire insurance for the farm. "I understand the fire insurance," the neighbor replies, "but
how do you start a flood?"
The etymology of the term has been traced back to the eighteenth century,
when complex mathematical principles, the beginnings of modern probability theory,
were employed by an elite group of professional gamblers to assess their chances of
winning. "Hazard" was originally a term for dice games. See Tom Baker, On the
Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 239 (1996). A market for fire and
marine insurance arose shortly thereafter, based on the same probability analysis and
the idea of sharing or pooling risks. The original "moral hazards" were basically people
the insurance companies sought to avoid, as their disreputable habits made them high
risks (and thus, costly liabilities) for both more frequent mishaps and fraudulent
claims. In the 1960s, the term was taken over by economists like Kenneth Arrow to
refer to the counter-productive incentives inherent in all insurance programs, but this
was framed in terms of economic "rational actors" (basically, normal people) as opposed
to those lurking on the periphery of society's norms and morality. Id.
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substantial help from others. Usually this approach rebuts the
"moral hazard" argument by focusing on addiction as a disease,
coupled with concerns about justice, mercy and redistribution
of wealth.
These alternative perspectives have directly influenced
the changes in legislation over the last few years, and continue
to form the basis for policy proposals for the future. Before
addressing the merits and implications of each approach, I
consider the nature of addiction and assumptions about the
degree of "choice" retained by those claiming alcoholism or
addiction as a disabling impairment.
A. Do Addicts Have a Choice?
The arguments for and against offering public benefits
to alcoholics or drug addicts depend heavily on assumptions
about the amount of choice addicts exercise. Moral hazard
arguments assume that the individuals in question can
respond to incentives, sometimes indirect, and to some degree
calculate and strategize about their own behavior.' Concerns
about the perverse incentives of encouraging substance abuse,
or the self-sufficiency incentives purported to attend the
discontinuance of benefits, assume a certain degree of self-
control, deliberation and "rational action" in the sense that
economists use the word.94 Similarly, advocates of a
rehabilitation-oriented approach base their arguments on the
idea that addicts are definitionally unable to help themselves,
that their "disease" renders their consumption involuntary, and
that outside intervention (from the state) is necessary to
facilitate recovery.95
There is certainly no agreement on the nature of
addiction, whether among medical professionals, academics or
jurists.9m Generally, those who suffer from addiction, and those
9 See infra notes 104-25 and accompanying text.
See Jones v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 191, 194 (7th Cir. 1994), where Judge Posner
explicitly opined that paying benefits to addicts gave rise to a lamentable moral hazard
problem: "A likely outcome of awarding Jones benefits would, therefore, be to enable
him to increase the scale of his addictions. That is an argument against awarding
disability benefits for disabilities that are due to addiction, and the law is otherwise."
See infra note 98.
The Supreme Court has noted on several occasions that "alcoholism has too
many definitions and disease has practically none." Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 522
(1968) (rejecting "involuntariness" defense to public drunkenness conviction); Traynor
v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 550 (1988) (upholding the Veteran Administration's
regulation treating alcoholism as "willful misconduct" in certain cases: "[E]ven among
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treating them,9 describe the phenomenon in terms of complete
enslavement of the will, and readily use the label "disease" to
describe this problem. Recent neurological studies provide
some support for this.9
However, economists contradict the disease model by
showing that consumption patterns, even among addicts, often
respond to market forces such as price increases,
criminalization and taxes on the products.9 Addicts who are
given money vouchers in exchange for "clean" urine tests each
week respond well, and more so as the monetary amounts
many who consider alcoholism a 'disease' to which its victims are genetically
predisposed, the consumption of alcohol is not regarded as wholly involuntary").
Despite these expressions of skepticism on the part of the Court about the "disease"
view of alcoholism (which would presumably apply to other addictions as well), the
Court rejected the idea that the state of addiction could be criminalized in Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
See AVRAM GOLDSTEIN, ADDICTION: FROM BIOLOGY TO DRUG POLICY
(2001); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS, 176 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. This section of the DSM-
/V presents a rather sophisticated system for diagnosing and categorizing Substance
Dependence Disorder generally. The Substance Abuse Disorders are all classified as
304._, with the suffix identifying which substance is the object of the addiction. The
basic definition of an addiction, or Substance Dependence Disorder, is as follows:
The essential feature of Substance Dependence is a cluster of
cognitive, behavioral, and physiological symptoms indicating that
the individual continues use of the substance despite significant
substance-related problems. There is a pattern of repeated self-
administration that usually results in tolerance, withdrawal, and
compulsive drug-taking behavior. A diagnosis of Substance
Dependence can be applied to every class of substances except
caffeine. The symptoms of Dependence are similar across the
various categories of substances, but for certain classes some
symptoms are less salient, and in a few instances not all symptoms
apply (e.g., withdrawal symptoms are not specified for Hallucinogen
Dependence). Although not specifically listed as a criterion item,
.craving" (a strong subjective drive to use the substance) is likely to
be experienced by most (if not all) individuals with Substance
Dependence. Dependence is defined as a cluster of three or more of
the symptoms listed below occurring at any times in the same 12-
month period.
Id.
New brain-imaging technology demonstrates that many addictive
substances alter the brain physiologically, sometimes permanently. See, e.g., J.D.
Jentsch & J.R. Taylor, Impulsivity Resulting from the Frontostriatal Dysfunction in
Drug Abuse: Implications for the Control of Behavior by Reward-Related Stimuli, 146
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGIA 373 (Oct. 1999); George F. Koob & Michael Le Moal, Drug
Addiction, Dysregulation of Reward, and Allostasis, 24 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
97 (2001); T.E. Robinson & K.C. Berridge, Incentive-sensitization and Addiction, 96
ADDICTION 103 (Jan. 2001).
See Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, The Endogenous Determination
of Time Preference, Q. J. ECON. 112(3), 729 (1997), reprinted in BECKER, ACCOUNTING
FOR TAFSTES 50-118 (1998) [hereinafter BECKER, ACOUNTING]; Gary Becker & K.M.
Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 J. OF POLITICAL ECON. 675 (1988).
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increase.'O° Classic behavioralists and some philosophers insist
that addictive consumption cannot be "involuntary" in the same
sense as blinking or grand mal seizures.'0 ' The fact that addicts
take the necessary steps to purchase, administer and enjoy
their favorite substance indicates a "voluntary" component to
the problem that belies the appellation of "disease."' 2 It is also
somewhat self-serving for the medical community to pronounce
something a "disease," as this may persuade insurers to
reimburse treatment procedures.' ° And of course, addicts, like
everyone else, have an incentive to describe their socially
unacceptable behavior in terms that absolve them of moral
culpability or responsibility.
The "disease" model does not collapse so easily, however,
because considerable evidence exists that addicts act against
many of their own preferences and self-interest to continue
indulging their habit. Harvard Professor Gene Heyman pointed
out that an addict faces a future of steadily increasing costs for
continued consumption: escalating social and familial
problems, increasingly deteriorated health, increased risk of
100 Suzette M. Evans et al., Smoked Cocaine Self-Administration in Females
and Voucher Incentives for Abstinence, 10 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE 143 (1998); Elizabeth
Katz et al., Reinforcement-Based Outpatient Treatment For Opiate and Cocaine
Abusers, 20 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 93 (2001); Michael Kidorf et al.,
Increasing Employment of Opioid Dependence Outpatients: And Intensive Behavioral
Intervention, 50 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 73 (1998) (making methadone access
made contingent upon securing employment, as opposed to monetary rewards); Mark
P. Reilly et al., Impulsivity and Voucher Versus Money Preference in Polydrug-
Depenendents Participants Enrolled in a Contingency-Management-Based Substance
Abuse Treatment Program, 19 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 253 (2000); Elias
Robles et al., The Brief Abstinence Test: Voucher-Based Reinforcement of Cocaine
Abstinence, 58 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 205 (2000); Jennifer Rothflieisch et al.,
Use of Monetary Reinforcers by Cocaine-Dependent Outpatients, 17 J. SUBSTANCE
ABUSE TREATMENT 229 (1999).
101 See, e.g., Herb Fingarette, The Perils of Powell: In Search of A Factual
Foundation for the "Disease Concept of Alcoholism," 83 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1970).
102 Critics of the "disease" model, with its focus on the involuntary nature of
addiction, often point to the fact that most substance abusers never develop serious
dependency problems. Moreover, many who suffer from addiction simply rehabilitate
themselves at some point through a process of tough choices and some changes to their
surroundings. An oft-cited anecdote recounts how soldiers returning from Vietnam
simply abandoned their heroin addictions upon their return to civilian life. See
generally Fingarette, supra note 101.
103 Noting that sometimes vested interests and professional agendas
contribute to the stances taken on defining the problem, a federal district court in
Granville House Inc. v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 550 F. Supp. 628, 632 (D.
Minn. 1982) stated, "[o]n one level, the debate appears to take the form of turf
skirmishes. The American Medical Association ("AMA"), since 1957, has classified
alcoholism as a physical disease. The American Psychiatric Association ("APA"), in the
Third Edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III),
lists alcoholism as a mental disorder."
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trouble with the law and diminished ability to earn a living 14
As costs increase, the benefits steadily decrease as the -addict
develops tolerance to the substance. 105 Thus, the addictive
substance should have ever-diminishing utility to the addict.
Nevertheless, the addict's appetite or preference for the
substance continues to grow, apparently exponentially,"° until
a maximum point is reached, not of satiation, but of physical
and temporal capacity to consume all available supplies. This
seems "irrational" in the sense that most people use the term,
and even "compulsive." Compared to other behaviors, addiction
looks more like those that are coerced from an external source,
and unlike the typical choices people make when they
deliberate about what is best.
Heyman suggested a workable model for reconciling
these apparent contradictions. Noting that most "rational
actors" choose not between discrete alternatives or options, but
rather between combinations of choices or alternatives, he built
a sophisticated model in which a rational actor could tailspin
into certain choices that become nearly 100% predictable, and
resemble compulsion or lack of volition. 7 Choice involves, in
the first place, an immediate decision about whether to
consider only immediate options, or to place the current choice
within a framework of clusters of choices."° Then the behavior
104 Gene M. Heyman, Resolving The Contradictions Of Addiction, 19 BEHAV.
& BRAIN SC. 561 (1996). Heyman, of Harvard University's Psychology Department,
summarizes his key ideas as:
(1) The behaviors that comprise addiction are voluntary even though
their net consequences are aversive. (2) A voluntary aversive state can
exist because the amount of behavior devoted to an activity is a
function of its relative (rather than absolute) reinforcement rate (the
matching law). (3) Local rather than overall value functions typically
determine drug preference.... (4) But there are occasions in which the
overall values functions determine preference, as when the drugs are
not immediately available and options are under scrutiny.
Id. at 574.
106 Id.
10 One study found that morphine addicts, given unlimited supply, will
increase their intake tenfold over the course of a month. Id. at 769-70. Addicts often
consume doses that would have proved lethal to them in their initial period of
consumption. Id. at 572.
101 Id. at 567-71.
'08 Heyman subjects his students to a thought problem involving the selection
of restaurants, Chinese or Italian, on a given evening. First, the students compare the
utility of each option for that particular decision, and select the one yielding greater
utility, based on given criteria. Then the problem is rephrased with preference
considerations for how many nights in a row a person would like to eat at the same
type of restaurant, which not only changes the equation, but usually changes the
result. See id. at 567-69.
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choice is made between the presently available options.' °9 Using
typical behavioral-economic equations and graphs, Heyman
demonstrated how each time one chose only between discrete,
immediate alternatives, rather than among a cluster of choices,
the likelihood rose that subsequent decisions also focused on
immediate options." °
Moreover, each consumption of an addictive substance
lowers the future value of almost all alternative or competing
goods and decreases the future value of the addictive good
itself. Addictive goods also have certain unique traits that
tamper with the preference scale. The goods generally provide
an intense pleasure or utility that ensues much more rapidly
(usually within seconds, or at most minutes) than almost all
109 To give another illustration, consider a simple, discrete choice between life
and death. Compared by themselves, there hardly seems to be any choice at all. When
these two extreme options are juxtaposed, the rational actor would inevitably choose
life. A simple choice between an undesirable, self-defeating option, which definitionally
forestalls all future enjoyment, and an option offering many possibilities for enjoyment
into the indefinite future, is so clear as to almost not constitute a real choice. Put this
way, it is tantamount to asking if the individual shall prefer what is preferable, or
what is not preferred. Indeed, sometimes "rational actor" arguments verge on being
tautological, as if saying that the rational actor will not prefer what she does not
prefer.
When the two, life and death, are isolated and juxtaposed in the
framing of the question, one outcome or selection becomes virtually
inevitable, and at least very predictable. The choice is greatly
diminished. The degree of globalization in making comparisons is an
initial, almost unconscious choice that can, in certain circumstances,
control the outcome of the "choice" presented to the conscious mind. The
point here is that the addict frames her "choice" in terms of simple,
juxtaposed options, instead of as global sets of options. Of the simple
options, one is preferable and the other is not, leaving the person "with
no choice" but to indulge the craving.
See also Richard A. Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to
Professor West, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1431, 1445 (1986) ("An alcoholic surrenders an
important part of his freedom and, it might seem, gets little in return.... If the 'choice'
to become an alcoholic, or more realistically the assumption of the risk of alcoholism, is
made on incomplete information or involves uncompensated costs to third parties ...
then it is not a 'free' choice in the Pareto-superior sense; and perhaps that is the case
with addiction.").
110 Heyman, supra note 104 at 567-73. This model uses occurrences rather
close to one another temporally, within a one or two week period. Framing the choice in
terms of immediate, discrete options is itself one of the preference-oriented
'combinations" that can be chosen. These alternatives are called the individual's
"Bookkeeping Scheme" in Heyman's article. While economists regularly acknowledge
that people choose between combinations of goods, not discrete alternatives, their
analysis of market behaviors typically works around discrete-choice models.
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other sources of pleasure or utility in life."' Additionally, the
intoxication process physically delays the enjoyment of other
competing sources of good until the intoxication is over, and
until any residual hangover subsides, which further discounts
their value. Unlike most conventional enjoyments, such as
eating a favorite food or watching an entertaining film,
intoxicating substances lack the natural inhibiting function of
satiation. 2 At some point, you have eaten so much that even
one more bite of your favorite dish would have aversive
consequences; one more time through your favorite movie
would be tedious. Not so with intoxicants, whose consumption
undermines the very mechanisms that facilitate moderate use.
Further, physical discomfort from withdrawal symptoms
strongly encourages repeated use."3 Finally, a growing body of
scientific research indicates that the substances alter the
physiology of the brain, specifically the areas that mediate
reward and conceptualize future values of goods.114
An addict, then, is on a track to exponentially increase
utility in consumption of the addictive substance compared to
other alternatives, as the value of competing interests
continuously decrease with each (ab)use. This is not "irrational"
in the sense that economists use the term, despite sliding
toward self-destruction. If anything, the addict is being hyper-
rational, choosing between discrete alternatives consistent
with predictable preferences. The behavior becomes
increasingly predictable, inevitable and less likely to be reigned
in through thoughtful self-control.
ill These effects are highly reliable and unusually immediate. Conventional
activities that alter one's mood in a desirable way are not as intense, immediate or
reliable as those produced by drugs and alcohol. Religious ecstasy, sexual fulfillment or
a "runner's high," for example, all require more effort, time and chance of failure. Id. at
572.
112 Id.
113 It should be noted that the DSM-IV does not consider "tolerance" or
"withdrawal" features a sine qua non for Dependence Disorders; rather, they are
.specifiers." See DSM-IV, supra note 97 at 176-78. Some substances produce far greater
"tolerance" or "withdrawal" symptoms than others. The DSM-IV reports that Cannabis
does not seem to produce any "withdrawal" symptoms. Recent studies, however, have
disputed the DSM-IV's position that Cannabis does not lead to withdrawal symptoms.
One recent study found that two-thirds of Cannabis-dependant patients reported
withdrawal. The same study found that progression from initial experimentation with
Cannabis to regular use was quite rapid, matching the progression of tobacco
dependence, and surpassing the progression of alcohol dependence. Thomas J. Crowley
et al., Cannabis Dependence, Withdrawal, and Reinforcing Effects Among Adolescents
with Conduct Symptoms and Substance Use Disorders, 50 DRUG & ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 27 (1998).
114 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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Behavioral scientists recently applied a paradigm called
"Momentum Theory" to the phenomenon of addiction, isolating
the strength ("mass") of the preference from its rate of response
("velocity").115 Heyman's explanation, though, more closely
captures the acceleration of a falling object than simple
momentum problems, since several factors combine to generate
exponential growth in the direction and force of the
preference. 1 6 The further an object falls, the harder it is to stop.
Heyman's model explains quite well how addicts experience a
"loss of control," observable to those around them (such as
family or treatment providers), while at the same time appear
to make a series of choices.
Heyman's model also highlights a difference in some
earlier law and economic models for addiction."7 Gary Becker
described addicts as "rational actors" whose present decisions
are weighted by future values of goods, such as the addictive
substance, although he acknowledged that addicts generally
discount the future excessively.1 Others, such as Judge
Richard Posner, portrayed addicts not only as hyperbolic
discounters," 9 but also as present-oriented selves externalizing
115 See, e.g., John Nevin & Randolf Grace, Behavioral Momentum and the Law
of Effect, 23 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 73 (2000).
116 Acceleration of objects caused by gravitational force is calculated as 9.8
(meters)/seconds2 . Using this as a model for decisions and preference, one could
analogize that the strength of the compulsion on the addict in a given situation is a
factor of the addictiveness of the substance (representing mass), with the time of
previous indulgence (either the length of the period of the addiction or the number of
times the craving has been indulged) squared. The point is that the reinforcing action
of the drug magnifies the likelihood of the next episode of consumption exponentially.
"' Addiction poses one of the most common and serious challenges to the
rational-actor model of the law and economics school. It appears to be the ultimate
example of purely irrational behavior, of individuals continuing to act in a way they
know to be self-destructive, counter-productive and against their other preferences.
The impingement on the most basic assumptions of economic theory made addiction an
important project for economic theorists, such as Gary Becker and (to a lesser extent)
Richard Posner, to tackle and explain.
11 See BECKER, ACCOUNTING, supra note 99, at 77-81.
19 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 267 (5th Ed.
1998) ("The rational prospective addict knows that he is or will be hooked, so any
permanent price reduction (as from legalization of drugs) will reduce not only the
current cost of consumption but future costs."); ("An addict, in economic terms, is one
whose demand for the addicting product is a positive function of his past consumption.
(Addiction is thus a form of habituation.) The rational addict will perceive an increase
in the cost of the product as in increase in his future rather than merely his present
expenses, because consuming the product now will make him more likely to buy it in
the future."). Id. at 529. See also A.L. Bretteville-Jensen, Addiction and Discounting,
18 J. HEALTH ECON. 393 (1999); George-Marios Angeletos et al., The Hyperbolic




the costs of present consumption onto their future selves.12 °
What economists call excessive discounting of the future
appears to be mostly a failure to reach a certain level of
abstraction in thought when making a decision.12' This accords
with Heyman's point that the initial decision to treat a choice
as a simple selection :rather than a complex, multifaceted
commitment begins the spiraling effect of addiction, when the
choice involves a substance that has certain intoxicating, non-
satiating and tolerance-producing effects.
Heyman's model also helps explain the clinical reports
that post-recovery relapses are not associated as much with
exposure to token amounts of the substance as much as with
life events that diminish the value of competing goals.'1
Contrary to popular urban legends, the "tiny sip" of alcohol
generally does not prime the rehabilitated addict into a binge of
renewed indulgence, nor do most relapses follow upon stints of
"craving." Rather, the occurrence of situations prompting the
recovering addict to engage in a certain type of choice-
focusing on immediate options and opportunities instead of
See Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1557 (1998); see also Richard Posner, Are We One Self or
Multiple Selves? Implications for Law and Public Policy, 3 LEGAL THEORY 23 (1997).
Posner adds that the ability to resist immediate gratification in order to enrich one's
future is the difference between a childish approach and that of an adult. See also
Bernard Williams, Persons, Character, and Morality, reprinted in MORAL LUCK 1
(1981). Becker explicitly disavows such a view, based on survey studies (and his
analytical model) showing that addicts' present consumption is affected by future
consequences, at least those related to permanent changes in the price of the addictive
substance. BECKER, ACCOUNTING, supra note 99, at 11. Interestingly, behavioral
scientists determined that the language faculties in the brain, rather than the faculties
used to conceptualize time, govern self-control and resistance to temptation in general.
See, e.g., Adam Gifford, Remembrance of Things Future and Self-Control (2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with California State University Department of
Economics).
121 Experiments with monkeys involved a game in which different size piles of
food treats were displayed, and each monkey was allowed to pick one. The monkeys
invariably picked the largest pile, but in the game, their first choice was always taken
away and given to another monkey, leaving the first to select a second, smaller pile.
Over time, the monkeys were trained to associate various sizes of treats with the
written numerals one through nine. Then, and only then, could the animals "get" the
game, and select a small pile first, knowing they would lose it to a companion, in order
to have the biggest pile available for the second round. The symbolic or semiotic
cognitive function (which enables language in humans) was shown to be the deciding
force in playing the game right, not the monkeys' ability to conceive of time and
duration. It should be noted that it took nine years to teach monkeys to play this
game, and only a few minutes for human children to comprehend it. See Gifforrd, supra
note 120.
12 Heyman, supra note 104, at 571. Another relapse-inducing factor seems to
be a revisiting of the environment or situation associated with the addictive
consumption period.
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more "global" goals and objectives -occasion a fall into the
disavowed patterns of indulgence.' 23
In summary, Heyman's model of rational addiction
seems to resolve the dispute about addiction being a "disease,"
by explaining both the compulsive nature of the problem and
the apparent decision-making or volitional activity that occurs.
He incorporated and reconciled the data from each competing
body of literature on addiction. The model improves upon
earlier views of "rational addiction" offered by Becker and
others, and I rely on it throughout the rest of this article.
Heyman remarked that his model implicated the
application of different incentives and treatment approaches
than would normally be used to influence decisions.' 24 The
model recognizes that one has great difficulty stepping out of
the choice-cycle of addiction, and increasingly so as the
syndrome progresses. Disincentive measures, such as increased
costs for the addictive substance, can be effective, but only if
the cost increase applies exclusively to the targeted substance,
and not to other goods or enjoyments in the person's life.
Diminished values of goods or combinations competing with the
addictive substance will foster addiction instead of abate it.
Conversely, enhancing overall value functions for the
individual makes the habit more resistible, bringing
consumption under the control of overall values, rather than
"local" or immediate functions.
This insight into the nature of addiction, and its relation
to individual volition or free will, has significant implications
for both the moral hazard analysis and rehabilitation policies.
The conclusions in these matters ultimately indicate the proper
direction for future policy and regulation.125
It should be noted that this phenomenon is not only troubling for the
"disease" model proponents, who often maintain that "just one drink" is dangerous
enough to make relapse inevitable, but also for behavioralists, as there is no correlation
between fits of craving and relapse. This behavior is unique to humans-laboratory
animals usually return to former consumption when "primed" with some alcohol or
other substance. Humans, however, can remain resolute in their abstinence, even when
exposed to a dose of the formerly enslaving substance.
im Heyman, supra note 104, at 570.
125 Of course, there remain virulent objections to the very use of the term
"rational" to describe or model addiction, especially by advocates for addicts' rights. See,
e.g., John F. Tomer, Addictions Are Not Rational: A Socio-Economic Model of Addictive
Behavior, 33 J. SOCIO-ECON. 243 (2001); Rex Greene, Towards A Policy of Mercy:
Addiction in the 1990's, 3 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 227, 229 (1991) (objecting to the
rational-actor approach to addiction as the basis for policy decisions); Christine Jolls et
al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1488 (1998).
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B. The Moral Hazard Problem
Undoubtedly the biggest argument against giving
benefits to addicts is that it provides special benefits, namely
money and free health insurance, to people for engaging in
undesirable, self-destructive or even illegal behavior in the
form of substance abuse and addiction. At worst, providing
welfare benefits might conceivably create an incentive to
develop and nurse a bad habit that not only poses possible
health risks, but significant externalities for innocent third
parties, like children and spouses, fellow drivers on the road
and law enforcement officers. At best, benefits provide a
decreased incentive for recipients to rehabilitate or refrain
from substance abuse, as the "costs" to the substance abuser
are decreased. Under this view, the system artificially props
them up. There are also policy concerns that the benefits
indirectly pump funds into the illegal drug industry.
126
This moral hazard problem was the underlying theme of
the political bromides leading up to the 1994 and 1996 changes
in the rules. The legislative history is replete with anecdotes of
purported system abuses, including "junkies" who designate
their suppliers as their "representative payees," and alcoholics
who designate their local watering hole as the mailing address
for their benefits checks.
127
An important distinction, of course, is the difference
between awarding benefits to addicts and awarding benefits on
the basis of addiction. Current law makes this distinction-
addicts can receive benefits, provided they have other
legitimate, qualifying impairments, but no one can get benefits
because of an addiction.28 In practice, however, the distinction
blurs in individual cases.
A significant assumption underlying the arguments
against granting benefits on the basis of addiction is that the
problem is the result of individual choices and decisions,
however irresponsible and self-destructive.2 This focus on the
For example, the Cato Institute's influential Policy Analysis Paper No. 224,
"SSI: The Black Hole of the Welfare State" asserted: "SSI pumps money directly into the
drug economy." Wright, supra note 1 ("The need for a government-administered
disability insurance program has never been established and is particularly
questionable given that a market for private disability insurance already exists."). Id.
See id. for a convenient collection of the anecdotes shared by Congressmen,
as well as some of the "scandals" highlighted by the media around the country.
M See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535 (2001).
The Cato Institute, for example, included this point in its Policy Analysis
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will power and volition of the individual implicates questions of
"responsibility." At this point, the linguistic instruments of the
rhetoric are slippery. "Responsibility" can refer to the causation
and agency of an action ("the junkies sleeping on the streets are
responsible for the drop in tourism to our city"), or to the
affixing of liability for undesirable happenings ("it is not their
environment that is to blame for their problems, but the
addicts themselves, who chose to try drugs in the first place")
or to the duty to prevent undesirable situations ("these people
should take responsibility for their own lives").130 The linguistic
problem is noteworthy because it blurs some of the policy
discussions, especially the important distinction between how a
problem arose and how it should be addressed. Strong
assumptions about free will and human volition underlie the
moral hazard arguments. Addiction results partly from the
external incentives afforded to the addicts, and many assume
an addict chooses her drug-induced euphoria over financial
self-sufficiency.
Public assistance in general presents a collective goods
problem. Social insurance (like SSDI and SSI) is a collective
good to which everyone contributes, so that together we are all
better off-but only if everyone else contributes as well.31 The
"good" that is attained is insurance against the devastating
effects of becoming disabled or unable to work. Under the
"rational self-maximizer" view, addicts seem to be the ultimate
free riders. The rest of society works and contributes to the tax
No. 224:
Although alcoholism is more often the problem than drug addiction,
substance abuse is now an independent basis for a finding of disability
if it is deemed to preclude substantial employment. That change in the
concept of disability was made in the regulations in 1975 but not fully
implemented until later. At present, SSI operates on the philosophy
that addiction is an illness and not a result of individual behavior and
choices. However, the view that addiction is a disease remains
disputed. Also, many health officials agree that even if addiction is a
disease, a person retains significant elements of personal choice and
personal responsibility. Because addiction is an independent basis for
disability, able-bodied substance abusers can receive disability benefits
without having to show liver damage or any other physical
manifestation of their addiction.
Wright, supra note 1.
1W MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 174-203 (1999).
131 See id. at 44 ("Surveys show that Medicare receives somewhat more
support from the public, but Medicaid nonetheless garners strong public support even




base, which obviously involves the universal sacrifice of leisure
time and escapist pleasures, while a few individuals are
perceived to subsist in constant leisure and escapist pleasure
as they leech a subsistence off the public good, making no
contribution themselves 3 2
Additionally, welfare implicates reciprocity principles of
gift-and-exchange. Oded Stark and Ita Falk argued that the
reciprocity mechanism, which motivates relief efforts for the
poor, is a utility function related in part to the gratitude of the
recipients.13 When welfare recipients appear ungrateful, or
seem to be taking advantage of the public generosity, a tit-for-
tat reaction ensues among the contributors. TM Persistent
substance abuse, which created the recipient's disability in the
first place, seems to embody non-reciprocation or appreciation
for the benefits conferred. The donor's response is to resent and
retaliate, as a further function of the reciprocity.
Of course, a moral hazard is present in all disability
insurance, private or public, for any type of impairment. The
availability of unearned monthly income on the basis of any
disability, such as blindness or partial paralysis, may create a
perverse incentive for the recipient to ignore available
treatment options and cures, and to engage more freely in risky
activities that could result in a disabling accident or injury. 35
13 While acknowledging that the public deeply resents welfare recipients
perceived to be lazy and indolent, Gilens asserts that public resentment toward welfare
recipients is more a function of public perceptions that the recipients are mostly racial
minorities, who are stereotyped as lazy. See id. at 154-73.
13 Oded Stark & Ita Falk, On the Transfer Value of Gratitude, in REFORMING
THE WELFARE STATE 313-26 (Herbert Giersch ed., 1997).
134 Id.
135 A deeper moral hazard question lurks in the background of the debate
regarding government benefits for the poor in all contexts, and whether such benefits
provide a disincentive to become self-sufficient. See Lars Soderstrom, Moral Hazard in
the Welfare State, in REFORMING THE WELFARE STATE 25-46 (Herbert Giersch ed.,
1997); see also GILENS, supra note 130 at 185 (noting that survey respondents were
actually less insistent on work requirements for welfare recipients than for "single
parents with drug or alcohol problems"). Many criticize SSI/SSDI in general, apart
from the segment relating to DA&A, for discouraging retirement savings and
vocational rehabilitation. See David Neumark & Elizabeth Powers, The Effect of
Means-Tested Income Support for the Elderly on Pre-Retirement Saving: Evidence From
the SSI Program in the U.S., 68 J. PUB. ECON. 181 (1998). This particular welfare
program is not alone in this regard; AFDC has been said to create disincentives to work
as well. See Elizabeth T. Powers, Does Means-Testing Welfare Discourage Saving?
Evidence from a Change in AFDC Policy in the United States, 68 J. PUB. ECON. 33
(1998); this view has been challenged as a semantic game in D.A. Long, From Support
To Self-Sufficiency: How Successful Are Programs in Advancing the Financial
Independence and Well-Being of Welfare Recipients?, 24 EVALUATION & PLAN. 389
(2001).
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Tom Baker summarized the usual rhetoric in this regard with
his aphorism, "Ib]ecause all insurance affects incentives to
reduce loss, welfare will increase poverty, workers'
compensation will increase worker accidents, and products
liability will increase consumer accidents."'3 Yet disability
insurance, both private and public, is widespread. The social
costs (externalities) of having uninsured injured and disabled
people in society, as well as general societal benefits, justify
insurance. 137
Economics lends one useful distinction to the discussion
of moral hazards. Economists differentiate between ex ante
moral hazard and ex post moral hazard.1" Ex ante moral hazard
refers to the incentive insurance provides to the insured to be
less careful in preventing loss, at best, or to create losses to
collect insurance at worst. 139 Ex post moral hazard refers to the
incentive for the insured to exaggerate a loss after it happens,
to prolong the loss or to fail to mitigate a loss through
reasonable self-help measures."4  Ex post moral hazard
generally is more relevant to health and disability insurance,
and therefore would be more relevant to SSI/SSDI.141
The distinction between ex ante and ex post is important
in the present context because there are two phases of
supposed choices connected to addictions. First, individuals
136 Baker, supra note 92, at 239. It should be noted that when insurance was
first widely marketed in the nineteenth century, many criticized it as a form of
gambling, an encouragement to crime and an interference with Divine Providence. Id.
at 255-60.
137 For a delineation of several society-wide benefits of the institution of
insurance, countering the moral hazard arguments against insurance generally, see
Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance As Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN.
INS. L.J. 11 (1999). Martin Gilens maintains that most Americans actually favor
funding SSI/SSDI as necessary, much more so than welfare programs perceived to
benefit able-bodied, working-age adults. See GILENS, supra note 130, at 12-13, 42-43,
212.
See Baker, supra note 92, at 270, (citing George L. Priest, A Theory of the
Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1314 (1981)).
Ms See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law,
96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547 (1987) [hereinafter, Priest, Insurance Crisis] ("Ex ante moral
hazard is the reduction in precautions taken by the insured to prevent loss, because of
the existence of insurance.").
140 Id. ("Ex post moral hazard is the increase in claims against the insurance
policy beyond the services the claimant would purchase if not insured. In the context of
medical insurance, for example, ex post moral hazard includes excessive (at full-price)
visits to doctors, longer hospital stays, and more elaborate and expensive methods of
treatment.").
141 Id. See also Baker, supra note 92, at 270-71; Evan M. Melhado, Economic
Theory, Economists, and the Formulation of Health Policy, 25 J. HEALTH POL., POLY &
L. 233, 239 (2000).
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choose to engage in some level of substance abuse that presents
a risk of addiction; the level of risk varies with the nature of
the substance and the frequency of use. Second, addicts
continue to indulge their habits, which involves some level of
choice, however irrational. Granting or withholding benefits for
those who are already addicted can be predicated only on
assumptions about the incentives for the latter choices.
Withholding benefits would realistically deter against
becoming addicted in the first place. The possibility of receiving
paltry benefits after developing a debilitating addiction is
unlikely to tempt anyone to pursue addiction. Thus, ex ante
moral hazard should be irrelevant to policy decisions about
SSI/SSDI benefits. Ex post moral hazard, however, is relevant
to the SSI/SSDI issue, because of the concern with the
incentives or disincentives to engage in self-help and self-
recovery once a debilitating addiction is already present.
Ex ante and ex post are easily confused. There is an
inescapable moral approbation on the first phase of choices,
and a widespread aversion to "rewarding" such reckless or self-
destructive behavior with cash benefits. 2 This moral issue is
significant for rhetoric and politics, but should be kept separate
from the "incentives" question for those who are now already
addicted. Moreover, to the extent that the more relevant form
of moral hazard is ex post, the appropriate devices should be
employed to address it. These devices are more akin to co-
insurance than deductibles. To the extent that the public
benefits are meager enough to fall slightly below the basic cost
of living, the recipients of disability benefits could be said to be
co-paying a percentage of the loss every month. For instance,
the standard SSI benefit in 2001 has about $530 per month.
The co-payment does not take the form of writing a check to
pay a portion of a bill, but is manifest when the recipient
endures some of poverty's grinding.
Both moral hazard types contribute to an additional,
insurance-type, economic problem, adverse selection." Adverse
selection refers to the unfortunate fact that the people most
likely to incur losses often want insurance the most, while the
safest individuals are likely to jump out of the insurance pool
142 See discussion supra note 92, and specifically Baker at 244-60.
143 See Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 139, at 1548 ("Where insureds, ex
post, can affect the level of claimed losses, the variance in expected risks increases.
Those individuals who are less likely to gain from exaggerated visits to doctors or from
more extensive hospitalization will drop out of the pool if full coverage is offered.").
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completely.' This skews the risk-averaging and law of big
numbers, which is the real advantage of insurance, making it
less profitable or beneficial for everyone involved. In the
welfare arena, adverse selection is an issue because those most
likely to be long-term cases, due to their inability to engage in
self-help, are more likely to seek welfare assistance in the first
place. Thus, the addicts who are most able or motivated to kick
their habit are more likely to do this themselves without going
through the hassle of applying for SSI/SSDI and attending
administrative hearings. Similarly, those who would take the
least time in treatment to achieve recovery status are most
likely to engage in self-help rather than seek government
assistance.
Conversely, those with the most tenacious addictions
are more likely to enroll on SSI/SSDI, which means that the
ranks swell with long-term or lifetime dependents. Success in
treatment and recovery is tied to the ease of social
rehabilitation: "[recovering] physicians obviously don't have as
far to go as street addicts."' This effect can create the
appearance of incentives working to prolong addictions and
encourage malingering. Incentives are at work, but these are
adverse-selection incentives, distinct from the perverse, loss-
increasing incentives of moral hazard. Applying the wrong
incentive measures can generate a reverse adverse-selection
problem, where those who need and merit the benefits the most
are least likely to get them.
When insurers apply mechanisms such as deductibles,
co-insurance and duty to mitigate loss (e.g., required
treatment), the moral hazard is significantly diluted.'4 Since
Social Security pays so little and requires so much compliance
with doctor-recommended treatment," these mechanisms are
in place already.'" The adverse selection problem actually
counters the ex post moral hazard problem in this case, because
144 Id.
14 Greene, supra note 125, at 229.
14 Each type of hazard can be addressed and ameliorated through unique
market mechanisms. Deductibles are a ubiquitous feature of insurance that addresses
ex ante moral hazards, by forcing the insured to pay some fixed sum toward the total
loss before filing a claim for the rest. See Priest, Insurance Crisis, supra note 139, at
1548. Co-insurance, in which claimants have to pay a percentage of each claim, is
particularly useful in addressing ex post moral hazards. Id. Both deductibles and
coinsurance mitigate the effect of each type of moral hazard to some extent.
147 Treatment Required for Disability, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1536 (2002).
148 Stone, supra note 137, at 28 ("Those who view insurance through the lens
of moral hazard do not see this disciplinary or regulatory power.").
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the individuals seeking SSI/SSDI benefits are those least likely
to be able to help themselves. In other words, the nature of the
disability is such that the applicants are to some extent the
most helpless, and as previously discussed, helplessness is
inversely proportional to the moral hazard effect. Finally,
drawing public attention to a social problem, such as the
debilitating effects of addiction, creates a type of reverse-moral-
hazard effect and provides an indirect deterrent for others.
There are more substantive problems with applying the
moral hazard model to welfare benefits for addicts. First, the
underlying assumptions about the interplay of addiction,
welfare and incentives are subject to criticisms on conceptual
grounds. Second, the empirical evidence suggests that the
predictions of the moral hazard model do not materialize as
expected.
1. Conceptual Problems with the Moral Hazard
Argument
If addicts consume involuntarily, or behave irrationally
(in the sense used by economists), then the moral hazard
incentive scheme would not apply. If the addict cannot scheme,
or respond at all to market forces, then no moral hazard exists.
This article, however, adopts the rational-actor view of
addiction, especially as laid out by Gene Heyman, although
Becker's view yields the same results."' While the addict may
exercise volition, she is locked into framing choices as simple,
discrete options juxtaposed to one another, and ignoring
attachments of those options to more global clusters of options
and consequences. This makes it unlikely that external
incentives will affect the addict as normal economic models
predict. Certainly ex ante moral hazard schemes are unlikely,
due to an addict's hyperbolic discounting of the future. Ex post
moral hazard is more of a concern, as simple inaction would fall
under this penumbra. Heyman's model demonstrates, however,
that the incentives likely to affect the addict's decisions are
only those that target the addictive substance directly, not
indirectly.15° Any external forces or stimuli that lower the
overall value of competing options, especially future options,
14 See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
150 Heyman, supra note 104, at 600-03.
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simply make addictive consumption more likely, and the
internal pressure to consume more virulent.
151
Instead, the "incentives" likely to reduce consumption or
facilitate rehabilitation are: (1) directly increasing the cost of
the addictive good, without diminishing the value of other life
goods; and (2) enhancing overall values, which not only
interferes with the discreet choice in a single episode of
consumption, but lures the addict toward more abstract,
forward-looking decision paradigms. Hence, clinics offering
monetary vouchers to addicts for a weekly "clean urine" test
prove very effective, not only in reducing consumption, but also
in moving the individual back into the workforce. Increasing
the addict's overall poverty is more likely to increase
consumption than decrease it. 152
2. Empirical/Inductive Research about Addiction,
Welfare and Incentives
The first set of problems with the moral hazard
approach is the conceptual difficulties with its underlying
assumptions. The second set of problems is the empirical
evidence testing the application of the approach. While both
sides have a quiver full of anecdotes to share, and a few studies
to cite, it seems that the best research indicates that the
receipt of public benefits does not encourage or increase drug or
alcohol dependency.
Proponents of the moral hazard argument usually
bolster it with anecdotes of outrageous system abuses, and
some clinical observations. For example, in 1995, the New
England Journal of Medicine printed an article entitled,
Disability Income, Cocaine Use, and Repeated Hospitalization
among Schizophrenic Cocaine Users: A Government-Sponsored
Revolving Door?'5 asserting that welfare programs were
fostering drug abuse by subsidizing drug habits. The results of
this study were merely that cocaine use, resultant psychiatric
151 Id.
152 The essential argument is that addictive substances function as a type of
"Giffen goods," an economic phenomenon in which the cost of certain inferior goods can
actually increase consumption of the good due to the resultant decrease in overall
income. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrance's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2434-
39 (1997) (arguing that drugs such as heroin function as Giffen goods).
163 A. Shaner et al., "Disability Income, Cocaine Use, and Repeated
Hospitalization among Schizophrenic Cocaine Users: A Government-Sponsored
Revolving Door?" NEW ENG. J. MED. 333, no 9 at 777 (1995).
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symptoms and drug-related hospitalizations all peaked during
the first week of every month, which is when welfare
beneficiaries typically receive their checks.'TM This does not,
however, demonstrate a cause-and-effect relationship. The fact
that addicts are more likely to binge, if at all, immediately
upon the receipt of their only income for the month tells very
little about the etiology of the addiction or its ongoing progress.
Those who subsist entirely on government benefits issued once
per month are likely to have general consumption patterns tied
to this monthly spike in income. Retailers in poor
neighborhoods are likely to find a surge in food and clothing
purchases in the days following issuance of welfare checks.
A subsequent scientific study conducted by Robert
Rosenheck and Linda Frisman in 1996 specifically disputed the
New England Journal of Medicine article. 15 5 They conducted
the study at nine sites involving 655 subjects.' 56 The results
showed a significant relationship between overall income level
and substance abuse, whether alcohol or drugs: individuals
with more income were more likely to purchase and abuse
drugs and alcohol.'57 Rosenheck and Frisman concluded,
however, that neither the source of income nor the amount of
welfare benefits received had any correlation to drug use.158
15 Id. In many states, welfare recipients no longer receive "checks." Rather,
direct deposit into a bank account is used to disburse cash assistance. The Social
Security Administration strongly encourages beneficiaries to identify an account for
electronic transfer of funds. States like Connecticut have switched to an Electronic
Benefits Transfer ("EBT") card system, much like an ATM card, for Food Stamps,
TANF and General Assistance payments.
155 Robert Rosenheck & Linda Frisman, Do Public Support Payments
Encourage Substance Abuse?, 15 HEALTH AFF. 192, 194 (1996). Rosenheck is a clinical
professor of psychiatry at Yale Medical School and director of the Department of
Veterans Affairs Northeast Program Evaluation Center; Frisman is associate director
of the Northeast Program Evaluation Center and associate research assistant at Yale
Medical School.
15 Id. at 193.
157 Id.
158 However, the coefficients revealed no statistically significant
relationships between public support payments and any of the
substance abuse measures. In other words, in this study those who
received high levels of public funding had no greater tendency to use or
purchase drugs or alcohol than did public support recipients who
received lower levels of funding. Also, although the findings suggest
higher levels of substance abuse for the study group as a whole [i.e.,
veterans], on average, public support recipients reported significantly
lower levels of substance abuse and spending than did those who did
not receive any form of public support, even though the former group
had higher total income.
[Vol. 68: 1
SHOULD ADDICTS GET WELFARE?
Interestingly, a smaller longitudinal study on a
subgroup of the subjects over an eight-month period showed
that substance abuse habits did not change substantially
despite fluctuating amounts of benefits received during the
period, although admittedly the increase in benefits was in the
form of housing subsidies. 5 9 In economic terms, however, the
provision of in-kind support such as housing subsidies would
simply free up more cash income for increased drug or alcohol
spending, so the nature of the increased benefits should not
matter. Following my previously discussed choice analysis,
moving money from one area to another in this manner would
require a global decision.
Rosenheck and Frisman noted several caveats, such as
the possibility that the sample group could have skewed the
results if public support recipients tend to be sicker and
therefore less prone to abuse drugs and alcohol.'r6 In reality,
however, the opposite seems to be true, as those in the greatest
distress tend to use substance abuse as a form of self-
medication or escapism.
Rosenheck and Frisman observed that addicts were
particularly vulnerable to homelessness and related health
risks. 6' They urged policy makers to distinguish "the public
health goal of protecting a vulnerable population from
moralistic concerns that funds should not be spent on certain
activities, especially when such funds have been shown to help
remove homeless persons from the street."'6 2
I present the Rosenheck and Frisman study for the
simple point that the empirical evidence does not support the
moral hazard predictions. 6' The moral hazard argument has a
"m Id.
160 Rosenheck & Frisman, supra note 155, at 193. Anticipating a possible
criticism that the subjects may not have been truthful about their substance abuse out
of fear of losing their benefits, the authors point out that at the time of the study, no
such consequences could have occurred, as the laws had not changed yet. There would
have been no real incentive for the participants in the study to report untruthfully.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Another study in 1999 found the same results as Rosenheck and Frisman,
although the study was much smaller (218 subjects). See James A. Swartz & Paul
Goldstein, The Prevalence of Lifetime and Current Server Psychiatric Disorders, Drug
Dependence, and Current Illegal Drug Use Among Former SSI Recipients for Drug
And Alcohol Addiction, Presentation before the Academy for Health Services Sixteenth
Annual Meeting (July 31, 1999) (abstract available at http://www.ahsr.org/1999/abstr-
acts/swartz2.htm) ("[Nior was there any relationship between disability status and
illegal drug use for any of the drugs tested .... Contrary to some assessments of the
SSI DA&A program, drug use does not appear to be related to the receipt of benefits.")
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broad political appeal because it is so intuitive; most people
respond to external incentives and are familiar with the social
norms that prohibit a free ride. The argument is weakened
substantially if the assumptions are simply incorrect, if
rational decision making cannot be imputed to those living
with serious addictions. Moreover, while moral hazard
intuitions take great courage from anecdotes that confirm the
fears, empirical studies show that the phenomenon does not
really occur. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the moral hazard
problem, if for no other reason than it will continue to figure
prominently in political debates and as part of the intuitive
initial reaction on the part of voters. Although misguided,
moral hazard concerns remain part of the political reality. And
by "providing a 'scientific' basis for the abandonment of legal
rules and social policies, the economics of moral hazard
legitimate that abandonment as the result of a search for truth,
not an exercise of power."" 4
C. Rehabilitation Goals
The arguments in favor of providing benefits on the
basis of DA&A generally focus on the individuals themselves
and the need for rehabilitation. Advocates of this approach
view addiction from a medical perspective, as a disease, and
tend to emphasize the uncontrollable behavior associated with
the habit rather than free will and individual decision-making.
One argument in favor of assisting addicts, then, runs
something like this: addicts are in the grip of an evil they
cannot readily overcome. At best, withholding public assistance
allows nature to take its course in slowly "thinning the herd"1"
and at worst hastens this cruel process. An addict either
heroically overcomes addiction, taming the beast alone, or
becomes increasingly dependent, unproductive, malnourished
and marginalized from society. Eventually, he will become a
vagrant, subject to the well-known perils of homelessness. He
will finally succumb to exposure, starvation, insanity or street
violence. In the alternative, his desperate situation will drive
him to a life of crime for sustenance: theft, prostitution or for
the entrepreneurial, the drug trade. Apart from the occasional
(emphasis added).
164 Baker, supra note 92, at 240.
165 "[A] social Darwinist solution to rid society of unworthy people." Greene,
supra note 125, at 233.
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hero who rehabilitates successfully, the rest come to an
inevitable demise with significant social externalities:
devastated families, increased crime, neglected children,
ubiquitous panhandling and unpaid emergency room bills.
Alcohol alone was a factor in a third of the crimes by adult
offenders in 1996.'
Public assistance provides a stabilizing influence, a
safety net for those in a downward spiral. It enables them to
obtain basic housing, a critical threshold between simple
poverty and outright desperation and irrational living. With
housing, hygiene improves dramatically and the individual can
begin to accrue property, obtain employment and sleep
unmolested on a regular schedule. Perhaps most significantly,
benefits enable addicts to get professional treatment and
recover from their underlying problem. SSI and SSDI both
provide recipients with Medicare/Medicaid, which covers the
cost of treatment programs, medications such as methadone
and anti-depressants, and inpatient services. It would seem
that everyone would agree upon a goal of helping addicts make
better decisions so they can reintegrate as productive members
of society. Cash assistance and medical coverage effectively
target the skewed decision-making process of addicts to help
them make better decisions, both for themselves and those
around them.
Rosenheck and Frisman cite several studies to support
the conclusion that "[a]ddictive disorders have been shown in
virtually every community survey to be a major risk factor for
homelessness, as well as for other health, social, and economic
consequences."'1 Their article closes with a good summation of
the rehabilitation-goal position:
The substance abuse epidemic is having a devastating effect on our
society, and all possible remedies should be investigated. This study
suggests that policies that are developed on the basis of anecdotal
evidence, even though they are responsive to the hardening tide of
public opinion, may lead to inefficient and ineffective use of public
resources, or to punitive withdrawal of funds that are desperately
needed and have been shown to contribute to achieving their desired
goals.
166 See Dess Aldredge Grangetto, Reducing Recidivism by Substance Abusers
Who Commit Drug and Alcohol Related Crimes, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 383, 389(1999).
19 See Rosenheck & Frisman, supra note 155, at 199.
168 Id. at 194.
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Others share this view, especially those with expertise
in the problem of homelessness. For example, the National
Coalition for the Homeless published a series of Fact Sheets in
1999, one of which observes:
Untreated addictive disorders do contribute to homelessness. For
those with below-living wage incomes and just one step away from
homelessness, the onset or exacerbation of an addictive disorder may
provide just the catalyst to plunge them into residential instability.
And for people who are addicted and homeless, the health condition
may be prolonged by the very life circumstance in which he or she
finds her/himself. Alcohol and drug use may help meet immediate
needs by providing respite from otherwise stressful and sometimes
violent conditions, and thus distract from activities oriented toward
stability.
16
The authors also cite studies by others demonstrating
that "housing stability is essential for successful treatment
and/or recovery."1 70 When those suffering from addictions lack
the resources to rent an apartment, to create some stability in
their lives, treatment and recovery remain an elusive dream.
Homelessness itself is not a bar to receiving SSIISSDI
benefits, 17' but deprivation of any source of income is an
obstacle to retaining housing, and homelessness does
substantially interfere with successful treatment of a substance
abuse problem.
What is the government's responsibility to intervene in
an addict's life? The question remains how to justify-much
less mandate-government funding for addiction, which may
devastate the individual's life and lead to homelessness. A
partial answer is to address the externalities to addiction that
policy discussions often overlook. Addicts do not only harm
themselves. Many have families: parents, spouses, children,
whose lives are seriously adversely affected by the presence of
addiction in the home. Addiction can cause domestic abuse and
neglect.172 The state has other vehicles for addressing abuse
169 NAVL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, ADDICTION DISORDERS AND
HOMELESSNESS: NCH FACTSHEET #6 (Apr. 1999), available at http://www.national-
homeless.org/addict.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2002).
170 Id. (citing Deirdre Oakley & Deborah L. Dennis, Responding to the Needs
of Homeless People with Alcohol, Drug, and/or Mental Disorders, in HOMELESSNESS IN
AMERICA (1996)).
171 This was ensured by the passage of the McKinney Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-77 (1987).
172 See JILL DAVIES, SAFETY PLANNING WITH BATTERED WOMEN: COMPLEX
LIVESJDIFFICULT CHOICES 31 (1998) (citing G. Hotaling & D. Sugarman, An Analysis of
Risk Markers in Husband to Wife Violence: The Current State of Knowledge, VIOLENCE
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and neglect, but these measures have significant costs for the
victims as well. The arrest and imprisonment of a family
member often deprives the children, innocent bystanders to the
root problem, of a badly needed source of income for the
family. 73 The tearing apart of family units by state agencies,
and placement by a byzantine foster care system, is certainly
not an ideal solution to the problem. Such post facto measures
fail to address the root problem of addiction. Moreover, the
addiction problem itself is more efficient and effective than
creating coping mechanisms for its destructive wake.
Another common externality is the cost to theoretical
employers in the form of an addict's lost productivity. These
costs are irrelevant here, as the SSI/SSDI programs apply only
to those who are not engaged in any substantial gainful
activity. This externality, however, should be part of the
calculus for the overall social cost of disallowing benefits for
DA&A. The ideal result of the termination of benefits is for the
former recipients to re-enter the workforce. This is certainly
preferable to the only clear alternative, relying on criminal
activity for income. The addicts receiving assistance already
demonstrated that the severity of their problem kept them
from working. Forcing these individuals into the workforce is
tantamount moving legions of demonstrably unproductive,
irrational-choice actors into the American workforce, for
employers to accommodate.
An instantaneous transformation of drug addicts or
alcoholics into disciplined, productive, aspiring laborers is
doubtful. Rather, the employers will have to either
accommodate a great deal of wasteful activity (missed work,
lack of productivity and interpersonal conflicts) or apply classic
market forces and terminate the addict (or recovering addict).
The addict will then move from job to job, for some protracted
period, during which specialized skills and good work habits
cannot be developed. For the employers, administrative
personnel costs would probably increase. Even assuming that
the harsh realities of the market would indeed force addicts to
"wake up" and behave consistently in socially appropriate
ways, a significant time factor is involved. During this
transition, significant waste occurs and social costs are
imposed on private employers and individual families.
AND VICTIMS 1, 101-24).
173 See DAVIES, supra note 172, at 31.
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Applying a social insurance program like SSI/SSDI to this
situation diffuses this burden widely so the individual effects
are less devastating.
A corollary to the rehabilitation argument essentially
relies on a moral duty of the state to care for its most
vulnerable citizens, such as the homeless and disabled. I do not
discuss the moral argument at length here, because it tends to
function simply as a statement of political party alignment.
Further, the perceived immorality of substance abuse itself
also weakens the argument. The morality of addiction is tricky.
It is difficult to separate conceptually substance abuse from
addiction, as addiction necessarily involves substance abuse,
but the reverse is not necessarily true. In lieu of an argument
about the government's moral duty to help the helpless, this
discussion focuses on more pragmatic arguments for
expenditures to stabilize and rehabilitate the addict.'74
An important issue for rehabilitation arguments, and
part of the justification for government intervention, is the
underlying assumption that addicts are essentially helpless to
rehabilitate themselves. This is a reasonable assumption under
both the "disease" view of addiction, considering the behavior
involuntary, and the "rational actor" view, discussed above. 175
The degree to which an addict could engage in self-help
or freely choose rehabilitation is at the crux of both the moral
hazard problem and the rehabilitation goal. If addicts could
cease and desist from their consumption of intoxicants given
the right incentives, then the moral hazard argument and
moral condemnation of the addict are more appropriate. If the
addict is essentially helpless, then outside assistance is
necessary to foster rehabilitation and would give addicts a
chance for effective recovery.176
174 For a recent argument about the moral duty of government, see Hon.
Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and
Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439 (1999).
175 See discussion supra notes 96-103 and corresponding text. For a less
precise treatment of the differing views on the voluntariness of addictive behavior, see
Alan Schwartz, Views of Addiction and the Duty to Warn, 75 VA. L. REV. 509, 511-14
(1989), which focuses on liability for cigarette companies.
176 There is a well-publicized study with rats involving cocaine dependence
and treatment, indicating that increasing the standard of living or available pleasures
and diversions of addicts decreases or eliminates substance abuse. See Greene, supra
note 125, at 236 (citing Bruce Alexander et al., Rat Pack Chronicle, 22 BRIT. COLUMX
MED. J. 54 (1980)) ([I]solated rats offered unlimited access to cocaine in 'rat jails'
quickly died from non-stop drug consumption. What has been little publicized,
however, is the fact that these addicted rats-if returned to pleasant, socialized rat
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A separate but related moral question remains about
the volitional origin of the addiction, apart from the question of
whether the addiction continues at the permission of the
addict's will. Some policy makers and Social Security
adjudicators may believe at some level that addicts, while
unable to stop their current consumption, deserve to be
punished for becoming addicts in the first place.
Early attempts to criminalize addiction seem based on
moral approbation of becoming dependent rather than the
morality of compulsively feeding the habit.77 The Supreme
Court, however, looked only at the morality of the habit and
refused to criminalize addiction because "state of being" crimes
are unconstitutional.'7 s The use of addiction as a proxy for
punishing the reckless exposure of oneself to the risk of disease
presents a problem of moral luck.7 9 Most people who engage in
recreational substance abuse never become addicts,'o so it is
inappropriate to punish addicts for the consequence of their
action rather than their intent in the original action itself. This
invokes moral luck; the unintended outcome gives rise to
culpability sua sponte.'s' It would be even more inappropriate to
punish the unlucky ones for the activities of the whole group,
as these individuals have already suffered the consequences of
their actions.
environments ('rat parks')-lose all interest in drugs.").
177 One example of this thinking is set forth forcefully in Justice White's
dissent in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 600, 685-89 (1962), which includes helpful
references to earlier sources for this school of thought. Justice White's argument seems
to be that addiction is inseparable from consumption, and that it is perfectly acceptable
to punish consumption-even if the crime is proved circumstantially by the existence
of addiction.
178 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660.
179 "Moral luck" is a philosophical term describing the puzzle of moral
culpability sometimes being tied to the unintended outcome of one's actions, in contrast
to the usual approach that ties blameworthiness closely to intentions. See Williams,
supra note 120, at 20; CLAUDIA CARD, THE UNNATURAL LOTTERY: CHARACTER AND
MORAL LUCK, 32 (1996). Card herself seems focused on character and its relation to
reputation, social relationships and opportunities and identity.
M See Greene, supra note 125, at 229 ("Nonetheless, most estimates conclude
that 5-10% of casual illegal substance users will become end-stage addicts.").
181 For another example of SSI recipients getting the short end of the stick
from moral luck, see Milner v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 1998) (providing a
lengthy discussion of the "moral luck" problem by Judge Posner); for a discussion of
moral luck in other recent court decisions see United States v. Martinez, 16 F.3d 202,
206 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United
States v. Davis, 989 F.2d 244, 246 (7th Cir. 1993); Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators
Local 17 Pension Fund v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 13 F. Supp. 2d 753, 756 (N.D.
Ill. 1998); and United States v. Muntean, 870 F. Supp. 261, 263 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
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If there are people with addictions, helpless in their
uncontrolled dependence, then rehabilitation, if successful, will
likely require others to act. This imposes costs on the others;
the only remaining question is how those costs should be
allocated.
The rehabilitation goal has one other argument in its
favor. If we continue to have a universal disability insurance
program, as we do, then we especially want to encourage
treatment and recovery from the disabilities that qualify people
for the program. Returning people to the workforce makes
more funds available for the remaining disabled individuals,
but increases the number of workers who can contribute to the
fund. This has the potential to lower the premiums per capita.
Arguably, treatable or curable impairments should be
prioritized because of the increased efficiency and the time
value of the capital at stake, both in terms of increased
premiums and lower debits to beneficiaries.
Even if one chooses to focus on character and
environment as the cause of addiction, rather than innate
biological traits of the addicts or seductive powers of the
intoxicants, providing public assistance may be the best cure
for addiction. It changes the dire situation that fostered the
addiction. If the addict's desperate station in life contributes
substantially to uncontrollable dependence, then cash
assistance provides a more direct, efficient and effective
solution than if the addiction is caused by more difficult things
to change, such as innate traits of the addict or the substance.
In summary, the rehabilitation approach is the most
consistent with empirical studies of the results of recent
policies. A growing body of scientific, behavioral and social
science literature provides new insights into the mental
mechanisms of addiction, self-control and acquiescence to
temptation. The emerging model tends to run counter to the
traditional concerns of "moral hazard" as applied to SSI/SSDI
payments, and indicates that provision of benefits may actually
be the most prudent policy.
IV. POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE
Clearly, the moral hazard view currently reigns in the
legal regime. Insofar as the assumptions of the regime are
flawed, however, exploring possible policy alternatives is
worthwhile. What follows is a discussion of some possibilities
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for the future, including policies adverse to addicts, considering
the advantages and disadvantages of each.
A. Change Nothing
This may seem obvious, but it is important to remind
prospective policy zealots on both sides of an issue that the
default position-and perhaps the most likely outcome where
there is an even split of opinion-is to maintain the status quo.
The advantage of the status quo is that it avoids the costs
involved in fighting and winning a political battle to bring
about changes.
Moreover, the current arrangement may represent a
genuine political compromise that balances the values of
different constituent groups in appropriate proportion. Put
another way, things could be worse for addicts. Addiction could
be penalized outright and absolutely by denying benefits
regardless of other severe impairments that an addict may
have. Obviously things could also be better for addicts, as they
were in the pre-1994 period.'82
To look at this political equilibrium from another
standpoint, those advocating for more generous SSI/SSDI
benefits must weigh the possible political backlash that might
accompany a victory." 3 The social and moral stigma attached to
substance abuse and addiction is unlikely to vanish anytime
soon, so welfare benefits for addicts will continue to be
controversial. This is not an entirely sufficient justification for
maintaining the status quo, but it is a valid consideration to
remember.
The costs of the current system are high, and are likely
to increase over time. 84 The current arrangement shifts all the
externalities or social costs of addiction-the costs not borne by
the addict alone-to a concentrated few. The families and
neighbors of addicts, and urban dwellers generally, mostly
Some could argue that the period from 1994-1996 was actually better for
addicts than the pre-1994 period, in the sense that it mandated treatment referral and
directed more addicts into programs.
M3 See Wright, supra note 1, which calls for a general abolition of the entire
SSI system based in large part on the alleged abuses of the system by addicts (and, to a
lesser extent, children).
Costs include increased homelessness, decreased treatment participation,
and inadvertent deprivation of those with multiple impairments besides addiction. It is




innocent bystanders, bear the costs of addiction. SSI/SSDI
benefits function as a type of insurance for these individuals,
not just the addicts themselves, and spread the risks more
evenly and diffusely across the population. The costs of an
individual's addiction are the same whether borne by
government, or the families and neighbors. An addict's daily
sustenance must come from somewhere. The "somewhere" is
probably family members or relatives who feel a familial
obligation to provide housing and food to the individual. This
burdens the providers financially and emotionally. This burden
causes second-generation externalities such as lowered
productivity (caretaking of an addicted family member takes
time and energy), lowered consumption (because of depleted
resources) and less private investment capital (also because of
depleted personal resources). These externalities are
accompanied by other intangible costs on the family."'
The addict's sustenance may also come from residential
neighbors and those who work in or travel through the locale,
in the form of theft or consumption of private charity.
Additionally, neighbors bear involuntary externalities in the
form of nuisance'8 and diminished property values occasioned
by elevated crime rates.
An unsubsidized addict is also likely to partially
externalize the cost of medical care. SSI/SSDI provides medical
coverage through Medicaid or Medicare. Without this health
insurance, individuals tend to use the local emergency room as
their primary medical provider, leaving any bills unpaid. 187 The
hospital and the larger medical community, both providers and
users, bear these costs. (So do taxpayers, as the hospitals are
often public.)
If it is true that the externalized costs of addiction
(including the basic living expenses of the addict) are constant
and certain, then an argument can be made for cost sharing
'8 Half of adolescent drug users come from a home where there was an
alcoholic or addicted parent, indicating an externality for the children in an addict's
household. See Greene, supra note 125, at 229.
186 'Nuisance" is being used here in the classic tort/property sense. State
-nuisance statutes providing statutory grounds for eviction can include drug activity per
se, indicative of the virile externalities accompanying it. Public drunkenness criminal
statutes also probably reflect the perceived externalities of substance abuse and
addiction more than mere puritanical values, which would not result in a private/public
distinction.
187 Michael T. French et al., Chronic Illicit Drug Use, Health Services
Utilization and the Cost of Medical Care, 50 SOC. SCI& MED. 1703-13 (2000).
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through government benefits. This cost sharing becomes risk
sharing. Insurance spreads the costs of accidents and risk
across the group of insured, and becomes a type of collective
good. The externalities of addiction are not managed well
under the current legal arrangement. Changing the current
policies could obtain greater efficiency and overall social
welfare.
B. Make Things Harsher for Addicts
It is, of course, possible to make things harder for those
with addictions. While this may seem disingenuous in a paper
arguing for better treatment, this alternative cannot be
overlooked because it may be the most likely development in
the short term. For instance, a growing number of courts place
the burden on claimants to prove that their other recognized
impairments would remain at the requisite level of severity
without the presence of substance abuse.1 8 Placing the burden
of proof on claimants functions as a punitive measure against
them for being addicts at all. It indirectly demands that the
addict rehabilitate before getting benefits, because
rehabilitation is the surest way to prove the continuance and
severity of the other disabilities.
There are other ways to make the rules harsher for
substance abusers and addicts. The 1996 federal welfare
reforms, replacing the AFDC program with TANF block grants,
allowed states to implement a lifetime ban from family-based
cash assistance and food stamps for convicted drug felons.189
Congress could apply a similar rule to SSI/SSDI applicants or
apply a rule automatically denying benefits if any evidence
existed that the claimant abused a substance at any time.
The social costs and externalities of such rules are
basically the same as those attendant to the status quo, only on
a higher level. The theoretical benefits provide extra incentives
for people who refrain or rehabilitate themselves from
addictive substances. However, such incentives take the form
of extra costs on addicts or substance abusers, beyond those
already in place. Potential SSI recipients are, by definition,
185 See supra notes 38-51.
189 See Rukaiya Adams et al., Double Jeopardy: An Assessment of the Felony
Drug Provision of the Welfare Reform Act, 1998 study published by the Justice Policy
Institute in San Francisco, California, available at http://www.cjcj.org/jpi/doublejep-
pr.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
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financially destitute, and prospective SSDI recipients are
unable to work and face eventual bankruptcy, so claimants of
these higher costs are essentially judgment-proof. Thus, any
new costs imposed will be passed on to others instead of borne
by the addicts themselves. There is probably a limit to the
incentives one can place before individuals via regulatory
mechanisms, short of depriving the individual of personal
liberty and resorting to brute force or coercion. Once that limit
is reached, additional costs will transfer automatically to
innocent third parties who are related or close to the
individual. Overall, additional negative incentives toward self-
rehabilitation are inefficient well before reaching the point
where the addict simply cannot suffer any more, or has no
more to lose. The optimal point is difficult to determine
precisely even from the "incentives work" point of view. The
empirical studies evaluating welfare policy results merit extra
consideration in this regard, because they illustrate the
unfortunate and unexpected results of the punitive measures
imposed so far.1"
C. Return to the World as it was Before 1994
Many advocates for the homeless, SSI/SSDI recipients,
and recovery and treatment programs seek a return to the pre-
1994 policies. One option is to reinstate addiction as a
qualifying impairment for disability benefits, at least when
other physical or mental impairments are also present,
contingent on the recipient entering a treatment program. The
advantages implicate the general justifications for the
rehabilitation-goal model. Providing addicts with cash
assistance brings desperately-needed stability to their lives,
encourages treatment, recovery and rehabilitation, provides
some relief for the families and others around the addicts, and
generally fulfills part of the duty to help the less fortunate. The
costs, of course, are controversial. The perceived undesirable
effects that led to the 1994 changes in the rules remain, and all
the same arguments would circulate again.
Advocates of a return to pre-1994 policies need to assess
the feasibility of "turning back the clock" in politics. Advocacy
for doing anything the way it was done before the last set of
changes is unlikely to be popular politically, as this will
190 See supra notes 54-91.
[Vol. 68: 1
SHOULD ADDICTS GET WELFARE?
intuitively strike voters as regressive. From a purely pragmatic
standpoint, advocates will be more effective originating
something "new" to achieve the same purpose.' 9'
D. Return to the World as it was 1994-1996
During the brief intervening period between the first
wave of reforms in 1994 and the final legislation in 1996,
addicts could receive SSI/SSDI benefits. Congress provided
benefits for a maximum of three years, which was presumably
enough time to successfully begin treatment, recovery and
rehabilitation. During this short phase, treatment was not only
required to maintain benefits, but a nationwide system, or
network of specialized offices, was envisioned to refer the
recipients to nearby treatment programs and monitor their
compliance. This system was never fully implemented, so
results were never available for thorough assessment.192
Welfare recipients with addictions were required to designate a
representative payee who received and managed the disbursed
funds on the addict's behalf. 3 Finally, it should be noted that
even applicants with other qualifying impairments or
disabilities were required to participate in treatment programs
for their substance dependence disorders.
Given the short life of this arrangement, it might be
more politically feasible to "sell" it as a new, progressive
initiative than the pre-1994 system. Most Americans, and even
many politicians, simply do not remember it or never knew
about it.
The advantages of this alternative are that it directly
addresses the moral hazard concerns by conditioning benefits
on certain desirable behavior. It clearly encourages treatment
and rehabilitation, and provides an incentive to enter a
treatment program during the three years while providing a
temporary safety net to meet the needs of daily survival.
191 On the other hand, Martin Gilens asserts that Americans strongly favor
health care provision for the poor, even if that means higher taxes. See GILENS, supra
note 130 at 193.
19 Neither sufficient treatment programs nor enough offices for referral and
monitoring existed at the time.
19 The Representative Payee system is still intact, albeit with some
modifications, for claimants who are deemed unable to manage their own funds or who




Requiring treatment also avoids unnecessarily penalizing those
with other legitimate disabilities, and helps recovery.
One disadvantage of this alternative is that the referral
and monitoring network is very costly to establish and
maintain.19 Since 1996, however, drug treatment courts have
expanded for non-violent drug offenders in almost every state.
These courts actively monitor the treatment compliance for
participants. 95 There are now over 200 drug treatment courts
around the country, addressing not only drug treatment needs,
but also ancillary health and social services. 19 Perhaps this
infrastructure could also accommodate referral and monitoring
services for federal assistance recipients with a diminishing
added marginal cost.' 9v
Another possible disadvantage of this system is that it
corresponded to a period of astronomical growth in DA&A
applications and enrollment. It is unclear what factors are
primarily responsible for this phenomenon. It may have been
related to the economy in the early and mid-1990s, the
widespread mislabeling of cases as DA&A in order to encourage
as much participation in treatment programs as possible or
outreach and advertising efforts by the Social Security
Administration and private attorneys." As discussed above,
one study indicated that 20% of the growth may have been
attributable entirely to the increased value in Medicaid during
this period.'9 In any case, the spiraling numbers of recipients,
and the attendant costs, contributed to the harsh political
backlash in 1996, which left the DA&A individuals worse off
than they were before. The subject merits further study to try
to predict whether this process would repeat in today's political
and social environment.
194 See Interim Report, supra note 7, at ES-III.
19 See Grangetto, supra note 166, at 394.
196 S.L. Wenzel et al., Drug Courts: A Bridge Between Criminal Justice and
Health Services, 29 J. CRIM. JUST. 241, 243 (2001).
197 See Gloria Danziger & Jeffrey A. Kuhn, Drug Treatment Courts: Evolution,
Evaluation, and Future Directions, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POLY 166 (1999) (calling for
closer affiliation of Drug Treatment Courts with family courts to serve an expanded
role in the community).
198 See Interim Report, supra note 7.
9 See Yelowitz, supra note 25. On the other hand, Martin Gilens indicates
that there may have been political support for favoring this program over others during
the Reagan era, as voters perceived it to be helping the "deserving poor," those who are
truly disabled and unable to work. See GILENS, supra note 130, at 42.
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E. Add Addiction as a Factor that "May" or "Must" Be
Considered Under the Grid
Social Security regulations currently contain a special
section called the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the "Grid" for
practitioners).2°° These guidelines provide applicants with an
alternate path to qualify for disability benefits where their
impairments do not meet the requirements of the listed
qualifying impairments. 21' The Grid provides for adjudicators to
consider factors such as age,2 2 confinement to sedentary or
light work , inability to speak English,2 educational
deficiencies and lack of job experience. 205 Each of these factors
can independently limit the number of jobs realistically
available to an individual. Certain combinations of these
factors yield a statutorily-required finding of "Disabled."2 For
many applicants, the Grid was a lifesaver.
Addictions also interfere with one's ability to find and
maintain gainful employment. One policy option, therefore, is
to include addiction as one of the factors the SSA will consider
(or at least may consider), weighed together with other factors.
This approach is untried. A district court in Williams v.
Sullivan2°7 proposed the model:
As a rule, where a claimant suffers from nonexertional impairments
that significantly compromise his or her ability to engage in the full
range of employment activities that sheer physical capacities would
otherwise allow, Secretary may not mechanically apply the Grid.
20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2 (2002). Note that in at least one sense,
qualifying for benefits under the Grid is actually superior to "meeting a Listing," in
that the statutorily-defined nature of the disability should make one immune to
periodic medical cessation reviews. See RALPH WILBORN, WILBORN'S SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY ADVOCATE'S HANDBOOK VOL. 1: THE PROCESS UNIFICATION RULINGS, 9-1-33
(2000).
201 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 1 (2002).
See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app 2, at 201.00(g) & (h); Work Skills
and their Transferability as Intended by the Expanded Vocational Factors, S.S.R. 82-
41 (1982); Evaluation of Disability and Blindness in Initial Claims for Individuals Age
65 of Older, S.S.R. 99-3p (1999).
See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app 2 at 201.00(a) & (b) (2002).
2 See id. at 201.00(i).
2of See id. at 201.00(c),(d) & (e).
2W For example, a forty-five-year-old applicant restricted to sedentary work,
who is illiterate in English and has no specialized skills froan previous employment, is
statutorily disabled. See id. at 201.17 (describing Medical-Vocational Guidelines). If an
applicant with the same language and job skill deficiencies was age fifty, a light-work
restriction would be sufficient to qualify automatically for benefits. Id. at 202.09.
Williams v. Sullivan, 89-C5872, 1990 WL 70497 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 1990).
2002]
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Alcoholism and drug dependence are just such nonexertional
impairments. While it is true that "[bly itself, the mere finding that
an individual suffers from alcoholism is insufficient to support a
finding of disability" . . . alcohol or drug addiction that does not
qualify as a disability under the listings may yet contribute to a
finding of disability by preventing a claimant from holding a job
otherwise within his or her physical capacities. Where such
impairments constitute severe restrictions on a claimant's physical
ability to work. . . . Secretary [should] call for the opinion of a
vocational expert as to whether the claimant remains capable of
performing any job in the economy.208
The advantage of this alternative is that it recognizes
addiction as a debilitating impairment, without making
benefits available solely on that basis. No factor in the Grid,
except very high age, independently qualifies a person for
benefits. Moreover, including addiction as a factor in the Grid
removes the moral hazard that allegedly exists in giving
benefits to addicts, as it depends on other factors that are
completely, etiologically outside the claimant's control.
One possible disadvantage to this approach is a
potential "watering-down" effect on the other factors, making it
harder for non-addicts to qualify under the Grid than
previously. In practice, including another factor could make
those who would presently qualify under the Grid appear to be
"missing" a component of true disability. This would be an
undesirable effect. However, regulatory language could be
phrased in such a way as to avoid this problem.
A similar approach was used for the impairment of
obesity, which was removed from the Listings in 1999.m Yet,
Social Security still treats obesity as a factory which could
legitimately exacerbate other impairments, especially cardio-
vascular and muskulo-skeletal problems.21' While not part of
the Grid, obesity interacts with the remaining listed
impairments in much the same way as factors on the Grid.
Also, regulations encourage treatment for obesity, and may
penalize individuals who refuse to comply with recommended
treatment from their own physician.212
2o8 Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
On August 24, 1999, the Social Security Administration published a final
rule in the Federal Register deleting Listing 9.09, Obesity, from the Listing of
Impairments in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 1 (2002). The final rule was effective
October 25, 1999. See 20 C.P.R. pt. 404.
210 Evaluation of Obesity Purpose, S.S.R. 00-3p (2000).
211 Id.
212 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1530, 416.930 (2002) containing provisions regarding
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F. Allow DA&A as a Listing With Progressive Benefits, to
Reward Recovery Efforts
In a sense, this alternative would be a return to either
the pre-1994 or pre-1996 scenario, with a significant
modification: the cash benefits would increase incrementally
over time as the individual continued with treatment and made
progress. Addicts would receive medical coverage, making
treatment possible from the outset, but the cash benefits would
be lower than the normal $534 per month. Let us assume the
benefits would start at $200 per month for the first six months
or year. The promise of benefits increasing substantially after
six or twelve months encourages the recipient to pursue
treatment diligently. After two years of treatment, the cash
assistance amount would increase again, and so on, until it
reached the standard SSI amount that everyone else receives.
Clinical studies show that escalating vouchers are very
effective in encouraging complete abstinence for addicts in
outpatient treatment programs, lending support to the
effectiveness of this approach.
213
The advantage of this approach is that it accommodates
the moral hazard concerns of many policy makers without
completely excluding those who suffer from addictions. It
provides an addict with an incentive to seek out a treatment
program and participate. The initial cash amount is too low for
comfortable subsistence, so it does not give the recipient any
disincentive to seek recovery or rehabilitation.
Such a system of structured or graduated benefits would
function as an insurance deductible, a traditional device for
preventing moral hazard and lowering costs of the insurer,
which in this case is the SSA. The insurer and the recipient
then share or divide the risks of moral hazard, adverse
selection and the potential for malingering. Finally, this
alternative has the political appeal of paying the addict less
than is needed to survive, leaving no disposable income for
indulging the habit itself. This helps resolve concerns that
taxpayer money is being used to purchase drugs and alcohol.
noncompliance with recommended treatment for all impairments.
213 Kenneth Silverman et al., Increasing Opiate Abstinence Through Voucher-
Based Reinforcement Therapy, 41 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 157 (1996); Hendree
E. Jones et al., The Effectiveness of Incentives in Enhancing Treatment Attendance and




The disadvantages of this approach are twofold. First,
the nominal amount of cash assistance paid at the beginning
may not be enough to realize any benefit to the recipient. Too
little assistance will not stabilize the life of an addict, make
basic housing accessible or effect other lifestyle changes
necessary for effective treatment and recovery. Technically, the
recipient is "underinsured," which means that some of the
benefits of insurance are lost.
The second disadvantage of this approach is the
administrative cost of having a special category of recipients
whose benefit amounts are different from others, and change
periodically. This approach requires more monitoring and
record keeping by the SSA. However, complex monitoring and
administration are possible because the current regime has
individualized benefit levels for all SSDI recipients already
(depending on how much the person paid into the system).
Additionally, the current regime varies SSI levels for many
individuals depending on their housing situation or other
sources of income.
Allowing consideration of addiction as a legitimate
disability, statutes could require an individual to show she has
truly lost self-control or the ability to make responsible
decisions. Indicia could include risking or passively accepting
the disintegration of one's family, the loss of housing, loss of
employment and other self-harming events. Such evidentiary
requirements address policy concerns that some individuals
may allege an addiction when their dependence is still mild
enough that they could easily stop. It also helps further resolve
moral hazard quandaries by implementing insurance "triggers"
that no one with self-control and clarity of thought would
willfully seek or cause.
G. Make Eligibility Determinations Blind to DA&A
A final alternative would be to make DA&A irrelevant
to the determination of disability. This approach avoids
penalizing those who suffer from other legitimate disabilities,
while not directly subsidizing or "rewarding" the addiction
itself. The deficiency of this approach is that it is very close to
preserving the status quo, minus the burden placed on
claimants with co-morbidity; this approach may not go far
enough. As noted above, this appears to have been the SSA's
approach from 1972 through 1983, and perhaps through 1994,
if the Circuit Court decisions accurately reflect the general
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practice.214 This approach could be justified on the ground that
there remains a heated debate about the nature of addiction
and the role of volition. Intentionally ignoring the presence of
addiction-neither awarding benefits on this basis nor
penalizing claimants for having the problem-incorporates a
degree of agnosticism on an issue still eluding societal
consensus. If this solution were politically feasible, it may be
the best option.
A NOTE ON THE COCAINE VACCINE
Scientists recently developed a successful vaccine for
cocaine, and tests on human subjects are underway at Yale
University.215 The vaccine functions through antibodies and
blocks the brain from receiving the desired effect of cocaine. As
the cocaine vaccine becomes more widely available, and similar
vaccines are developed for other addictive substances, the
analysis of these cases could change substantially. Receipt of
benefits for addicts could be made contingent on voluntary
vaccination. At least for cocaine addiction, the addiction could
theoretically be eliminated with a simple injection, which
would make clear which debilitating symptoms remain without
substance abuse.
One issue that remains unclear about the cocaine
vaccine is whether immunized cocaine addicts simply switch to
other drugs once cocaine fails to produce the desired effect.
Studies on this point are not yet available.
The possibility of immunizing the population, or at least
sectors of it (such as convicted drug offenders), raises several
policy issues outside the scope of this paper. It could, over the
course of several decades, make DA&A benefits unnecessary.
214 See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
215 Barbara S. Fox, Development of a Therapeutic Vaccine for the Treatment of
Cocaine Addiction, 48 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 153 (1997); Peter J. Cohen,
Immunization for Prevention and Treatment of Cocaine Abuse: Legal and Ethical
Implications, 48 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 167 (1997); M. W. Johnson et al.,
Active Cocaine Immunization Attenuates the Discriminative Properties of Cocaine, 8
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 163 (May 2000); Dawn MacKeen, Immunized Against
Addiction, SALON, Apr. 26, 2000, at www.salon.com/health/feature2000/04126/vaccine/-




It is easy for most people to understand intuitively why
drug addicts or alcoholics should not be given public assistance
based on their addictions. It seems to invoke the type of moral
hazard concerns and perverse incentives faced in many areas of
life and prominent in ongoing policy discussions. No reasonable
person wants to encourage substance abuse or addiction.
On the other hand, if indeed empirical studies
accurately represent that welfare benefits do not encourage
substance abuse, then these moral hazard concerns are
unfounded. In addition, there are well-documented social costs
and externalities for leaving addictions untreated, and
depriving alcoholics and addicts of benefits has generated some
unpleasant results. It would be better in the long run to try to
stabilize the lives and housing situations of these individuals
so that they can be reintegrated as productive members of
society.
Several policy alternatives are available for the future.
Given the wide array of policy considerations and concepts of
addiction, the best approach is to allow alcoholism and drug
addiction to be considered a serious limitation on employment,
weighed with other factors in the Social Security "Grid," or
viewed as one factor like obesity. This alternative is probably
more politically feasible than returning to previous approaches
that were discarded, where addictions independently qualified
an applicant for benefits. It also allays many of the moral
hazard concerns by requiring that the substance dependence
occur in conjunction with other factors outside the applicant's
control, such as age and illiteracy. The regulations would have
to be carefully drafted so as not to dilute the weight of other
legitimate factors already considered.
For pragmatic reasons, this article has sought to avoid
sermonizing about issues of "justice," "fairness" or "mercy" on
the helpless. These important values, however, cannot be
ignored. Society may pay a price, eventually, for allowing some
members to fall into desperate circumstances. This fear is not
necessarily the best reason to act. Rather, a genuine concern
for fellow human beings, properly considered, may suffice.
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